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LEGAL THEORY AND THE OBLIGATION OF A
JUDGE: THE HART/DWORKIN DISPUTE
E. Philip Soper*t
Theories of law may be conceptual, descriptive, or normative. A
conceptual theory aims at the identification of those features that
are most important in justifying a decision to classify any social
structure as a legal system. Such theories, are, in short, attempts at real
definition of the concept of law or of a legal system. 1 Professor H.L.A.
Hart's theory, published in book form in 1961, is a conceptual theory. 2
A descriptive theory aims at the more modest goal of identifying important features of one or more particular legal systems without
concern for whether such features are to be found wherever the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Washington
University; J.D. 1969, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1972, Washington University.Ed.
t I am grateful to my colleagues, Don Regan, Terry Sandalow, and Rich Lempert for their assistance in discussing earlier versions of this article.
1. By "real definition" I mean to identify broadly those enterprises that make
objective claims concerning the correlation of the preanalytic phenomenon mentioned in the definiendum with postanalytic, nonverbal phenomena mentioned in the
definiens. I mean to contrast both "lexical definitions" (which correlate definiendum with actual or dictionary usage) and "stipulative definitions" ( which propose
correlations, but make no objective claims). Much of the dispute over whether "real
definition" is possible, particularly in the present context, see note 2 infra; cf. R.
SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS, 35-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as R. SARTORIUS, !NDIVIDU4L CONDUCT], arises on the assumption that the term refers
exclusively to the classical enterprise of classifying per genus et diff erentiam, with
the aim of producing necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of a
term. That enterprise, however, is only one of at least twelve distinct activities that
have gone by the name of "real definition." R. ROBINSON, DEFINITION ch. 6 (1954).
My use of the term "conceptual theory" does not presuppose a particular definitional theory beyond that stated above, although I am inclined to agree with those
who suggest that "real definition" in the classical sense is not as promising an undertaking (if it is possible at all) as the more modest goal of analyzing a complex concept into important, distinguishing features that yield an increased insight into the
nature of the concept. See id.; R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra, at 37-50.
For the meaning of "importance" in this context, see Sartorius, Book Review, 52
ARCHIV FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 161, 163 (1966).
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as CONCEPT
OF LAw]. Hart's insistence that he is not providing a definition of law, see id.
at 16, should probably be understood as referring to definition in the classical sense.
See note 1 supra. Even in that sense, commentators have detected equivocation in
Hart's characterization of the enterprise in which he is engaged. See Brown, Book
Review, 72 PHIL. REV. 250 (1963); Singer, Hart's Concept of Law, 60 J. PHIL. 197,
200 (1963). Compare Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV.
37 (1954) and CONCEPT OF LAw, supra, at 16, with CONCEPT OF LAW, supra, at
113.
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phenomenon of law is encountered. A descriptive theory thus may
or may not conflict with a conceptual theory. Where conflict
does result, it is by way of counterexample rather than countertheory.
Confronted with features identified as important in a descriptive
theory but ignored in his own, a conceptual theorist may respond to
the apparent counterexample in three ways: (1) he may dispute the
accuracy of the description; (2) he may assume that the features have
been accurately described, but deny that they are incompatible with
the basic conceptual model; or (3) he may deny that the structure
being described is in fact a legal system. Professor Ronald Dworkin,
in a recent trilogy of articles, 3 has advanced a descriptive theory 4 of
the Anglo-American legal system; he claims that the theory furnishes
a counterexample to the related conceptual theories of legal positivism
in general and of Professor Hart in particular. He also claims that
the theory provides a normative account of law 5 preferable to the
account provided by positivism.
The conceptual core of the positivist's theory, which Dworkin
attacks, is the claim that legal validity is determined by reference to a
master test-a standard or set of standards external to the judge that
can in theory be identified empirically and that serves as the ultimate
justification of the claim that the judge's decision in any particular
3. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14 (1967), reprinted in
LAW, REASON & JusncE 3 (G. Hughes ed. 1969), and as ls Law a System of Rules?,
in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (R. Summers ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Model
of Rules]; Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972) [hereinaHer cited as Social Rules]; Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV, 1057 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hard Cases]. See also Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J.
PHIL. 624 (1963).
4. I take Dworkin's theory to be descriptive rather than conceptual in part because that is how he characterizes it, see Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1101, and
in part because it has been implicitly presented from the beginning as a counterexample to positivism, rather than as an attempt to explicate the general concept
of "law" or "legal system." The possibility that one can view the theory as conceptual, in which case the argument for the theory remains incomplete, is briefly considered at the conclusion of this paper. See text at note 145 infra.
5. A normative theory describes the essential features that a legal system ought
to display. The proponent of such a theory is not an essential antagonist of either
the conceptual or the descriptive theorist. The normative theorist may critically evaluate a descriptive account of law by indicating the extent to which features identified
as prominent aspects of a particular legal system accord with the features that the
system ought to display. But the normative theorist cannot assume a similarly critical stance toward the conceptual theorist without turning the quest for real definition into a dispute about the most appropriate stipulative definition of law. The
normative theorist who finds himself at odds with the conceptual theorist must
either claim that only stipulative definitions are possible in this context, or he must
meet the latter on his own grounds by explaining why the conceptual theory, to
the extent it is incompatible with the normative account, also proves to be an inaccurate analysis of "law." Because I am concerned only with the latter dispute in
this paper, the normative aspect of Dworkin's theory will be largely ignored. But
cf. note 99 infra.
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case is in accordance with "the law." 6 The features of the AngloAmerican legal system that Dworkin claims cannot be accommodated
to such a "master-test model" are described by the following three
propositions, all of which Dworkin asserts and all of which I take to be
different ways of expi:essing a similar idea:
(1) There is a uniquely correct legal result in every judicial case;
(2) In deciding cases, judges never have discretion to select one of
two or more equally permissible results;
(3) The legal system, at any given moment, is a system of fully
determined entitlements. (That is to say, individuals never
approach courts as lobbyists might a legislature, arguing for decisions claimed to further collective goals or political aims of
of the society. Rather, litigants approach courts armed with
arguments of principle, correctly claiming that pre-existing individual or group rights determine the result a court must reach
whether or not some collective goal of society or general political aim is thereby served or for that matter disserved.)
This third formulation Dworkin calls the "rig~ts thesis." 7 On its
plausibility hinge solutions not only to questions about how judges
should approach and decide cases but also, Dworkin claims, to the
persistent puzzle about whether legal norms can even in theory be
separated from the broader class of norms encompassing political and
moral views of society.
6. I label the master-test theory the "conceptual core" of legal positivism primarily for purposes of describing Dworkin's argument. See Model of Rules, supra
note 3, at 17. (For a sampling of the variety of ways in which "positivism" is
used, see CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 253-54. See also text at note 132,
infra.) On this view of the "conceptual core of positivism," the difference between
Hart and his predecessors, Austin and Kelsen, lies primarily in refinements that are
made in describing the nature of the master test. In the view of both Kelsen and
Hart, Austin's description of law as the "command of the sovereign" ignores the
normative character of the phenomenon. The laws of a legal system are always
viewed by at least some members of the system-the officials-as imposing obligations, whereas "command" and "habit," however ingeniously combined, can never
produce more than the concept of "being obliged." See CONCEPT OF LAw, supra
note 2, at 79-83, 243. For Kelsen, the solution is simply to build the concept of
obligation into legal theory from the start as a primitive presupposition of any legal
system. Austin's sovereign, the "determinate person or body," is replaced by a
"norm"-the Grundnorm-the origin and nature of which are not further explained,
but simply "hypothesized." Hart's theory resembles Kelsen's, although the "rule of
recognition" replaces Kelsen's Grundnorm and, instead of leaving the origin of this
basic rule unexplained or "hypothesized," Hart simply roots it in the empirical fact
of acceptance by the officials of a system. The rule of recognition is the ultimate
criterion for legal validity and is itself empirically established by inspecting the attitudes and behavior of the officials of the system. See id. at 97-114, 245. See
generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart
ed. 1954); H. KELSEN, GENERAL 'fHEoRY OF LAW AND STATE (1949).
7. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1058-60. Although the rights thesis entails
two claims--that there is a single correct answer in judicial cases and that the answer
is to be extracted from "principles" rather than "policies"-! shall be concerned primarily with the former claim.
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The rights thesis will no doubt strike many as naive or implausible. Not since Blackstone has the view that judges only "find" and
do not "make" the law been preached with any fervor from academic
pulpits, whatever the "plain man's" view of the matter might be.
Indeed, under the influence of legal realism, many have suggested
that the more difficult task is to demonstrate that judges ever find
results required by pre-existing standards rather than continuously
create new law through the unavoidable exercise of a kind of quasilegislative discretion. Hart himself has adopted a familiar and widely
accepted stance between these extremes. 8 Legal standards can and
often do determine results. It is, however, a feature of man's predicament that his ·relative "ignorance of fact" and "indeterminancy of
aim" yield areas of "open texture" in the application of such standards that require judges to make "a fresh choice between open
alternatives. " 0 The pervasiveness of this moderate view may explain
why much of the discussion generated to date by Dworkin's account
has taken the form of the first of the three above-mentioned responses
to a descriptive theory: a challenge to the accuracy of the account. 10
This article offers a review of the Hart-Dworkin dispute11 and a
qualified defense of the positivist's model against Dworkin's attack.
The defense is cast primarily in the form of the second possible
response to a descriptive theory: Dworkin's attack fails, I suggest,
because it involves descriptive claims that can be accommodated to
the positivist's conceptual theory regardless of one's view about the
plausibility of those claims.
In reviewing the dispute, this paper also explores a secondary
thesis that appears to have become an erroneous and unnecessary part
of Dworkin's main argument. The secondary thesis concerns the
8. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at ch. VII.
9. Id. at 125.
10. See, e.g., Christie, The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE L.J. 649; Greenawalt,
Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind
Judges, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975); Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of
Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 845-46 (1972); Tapper, A Note 011 Principles, 34 Moo. L.
REV. 628 (1971). Professor Sartorius is one of the few contemporary participants in the dispute, besides Dworkin, who accepts and forcefully argues for a version
of the rights thesis. See note 13 infra. See also I. SMrrn, LEGAL OBLIGATION ch.
IX (1976); Coval & Smith, Some Structural Properties of Legal Decisio11, 32 CAM·
BRIDGE L.J. 81 (1973).
11. "Dispute," I confess, implies a less one-sided exchange than in fact has taken
place. Except for a brief comment, see Hart, Law in the Perspective of Philosophy: 1776-1976, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 538, 545-51 (1976), Hart has not responded
specifically to Dworkin's arguments, although he has reconfirmed views concerning
judicial discretion that indicate continued disagreement with claims made by the
rights thesis. See id.; Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law in 6 ENCYC. OF
PHILOSOPHY 264, 271 (1967).
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proper classification of the standards to which judges are and ought
to be responsive in reaching legal decisions. Although Hart's position here is not entirely clear, Dworkin claims that such standards are
fundamentally of two kinds: either authoritatively binding on a
judge and hence "law," or "permissive" and hence extra-legal. I shall
argue that this is too summary a way of dealing with the variety of
standards that determine the specific content of the obligation of a
judge qua judge. Some standards bind judges, not because they are
law, but simply because they are part of what it means to be a judge.
The nature of my defense of positivism explains the organization
of this essay. Although Dworkin's most recent article, Hard Cases, 12
contains the fullest elaboration of the rights thesis, that piece is
exclusively concerned with the theory's descriptive and normative
claims. It does not renew the argument designed to show why the
thesis constitutes a counterexample to positivism. For that discussion, one must turn to Dworkin's earlier writings. Part I, then, examines the initial version of the argument and isolates the critical claim
in the counterexample thesis. Part II explores the "secondary thesis"-the possibility, and the relevance for legal theory, of separating
investigations into certain aspects of judicial obligation from investigations into legal validity. With these clarifications in hand, Part III
returns to an evaluation of Dworkin's major argument. Although the
section begins with a review of the difficulties Dworkin faces in
establishing the rights thesis, the primary concern in Part III is not
with the plausibility of that thesis. Dworkin may have failed to prove
his claims, but he has at least succeeded, I believe, in showing that the
evidence for the contrary position is equally inconclusive. In this
respect Dworkin's contribution is significant, both as a counterweight
to the tendency to accept uncritically realist dogma in any version,
however moderate, and as a plausible explanation of what it might
mean to accept a Blackstonian view of the law without also accepting
some of the more cryptic natural law underpinnings of Blackstone's
writings. Even assuming, however, that the rights thesis is ,correct,
Part III suggests that it need not be seen as incompatible with a
positivist model of law.13 Part IV offers some concluding observations on the significance of the dispute and suggests a line of inquiry
12. See note 3 supra.
13. The position adopted here is thus similar to that of Professor Sartorius, who
defends a version of the rights thesis but also argues-on somewhat different grounds
from those relied on here-that it is compatible with positivism. See R. SARTORIUS,
INDIVIDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1, at ch. 10; Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial
Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151 (1971).
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that is more likely to pose a challenge to the positivist's model than is
Dworkin's descriptive theory.

I.

DWORKIN:

TuE ORIGINAL POSITION

The chief weapon in Dworkin's initial attack on positivism was
a claimed logical distinction between two kinds of legal standards: rules and principles. Rules, like dictators, always get their
way. A rule, that is to say, is either app1icable to a particular
situation, in which case its directions must be accepted, or it is
inapplicable, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision. 14
When two rules conflict, one does not supersede the other because of
its greater weight, but only because, for example, another rule specifies which shall take precedence. A principle, in contrast, like a wise
counselor, "states a reason that argues in one direction," 16 but does
not by itself command a particular decision. When principles conflict, the conflict must be resolved by assessing the relative weights of
the competing principles. 16
Armed with these distinctions, Dworkin's counterexample argument proceeds through the following steps:
( 1) There are cases in the Anglo-American legal system
(Dworkin calls them "hard cases") where no applicable rule
determines the result the judge should reach. Examples include
cases that involve the creation of a new cause of action, such as
one for invasion of privacy, or the creation of a new exception
to an existing rule, as in Riggs v. Palmer, 11 where the court decided
that a murderer could not inherit under his victim's will despite
an inheritance statute that did not literally provide for such an
exception.
(2) In such cases it is a mistake to say that the judge has
discretion to decide what result to reach. It is still appropriate
to speak of a correct decision to which the parties are entitled and
which the judge is obligated to reach by reference to principles. In
Riggs, for example, the court justified its decision by referring to the
principle that "no man should profit from his own wrong." 18
(3) The principles in these cases are obligatory and binding
14. To use Dworkin's illustrations, a will is either valid or not, depending on
whether it complies with the rule for making wills (which may include stated excep•
tions), and a baseball player is either out because the rule that three strikes constitutes an out is applicable, or he is not. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 25.
15. Id. at 26.
16. See id. at 25-29.
17. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1'889).
18. 115 N.Y. at 509, 22 N.E. at 190.
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on the officials in the same way that a rule is and hence are "law"
in the same sense that rules are. That is, they are "standards
binding upon the officials of a community, controlling their decisions of legal right and obligation."19
( 4) It is not possible to modify the positivist's master test
(Hart's rule of recognition) to embrace principles because (a)
there is no general scheme for generating such principles-like
the rule of recognition they are simply accepted-and (b) we
cannot list said principles exhaustively ( thus simply adding them
to the rule of recognition) because "[t]hey are controversial, their
weight is all important, they are numberless, and they shift and
change so fast that the start of our list would be obsolete before
we reached the middle." 20
(5) Thus, the positivists' claim that a law of the community
can be distinguished from other social standards of the community by some test in the form of a master rule must be abandoned.
This section examines, first, the underlying distinction between
rules and J?rinciples on which the entire argument is based and,
second, the critical initial premise in the argument-namely, that
cases like Riggs are properly described as cases in which no rule
compels the judge's decision. 21

A.
l.

Rules and Principles
Agreeing on Terminology

Few subjects are as notoriously vulnerable as legal philosophy to
disputes that, upon examination, prove to be merely verbal. Apparently incompatible answers to what seems a single question-"what is
law?"-often turn out to be answers to quite different and unrelated
questions, reflecting differences in the underlying purpose of the
inquiry that must be understood if one is to measure the inquiry's
success. 22 A comparison of Dworkin's use of "rule" with Hart's
analysis of the same term illustrates how difference in purpose can
lead to difference in terminology.
Hart's description of law as a system of rules is the result of an
analysis intended primarily to distinguish rules from both habits and
19. Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 27.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Part II of this article explores the third step in the argument. Parts IIl(A)
and Ill(B) examine, respectively, the second and fourth steps.
22. See S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCAL THOUGHr 6567 (1959).
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coercive orders. 23 Although a similar pattern of behavior may be
observed in all three cases, an observer could record an additional
phenomenon only in the case of rules: deviation from the pattern
would become the occasion for criticism, which the group regards as
legitimate. This additional characteristic evidences a "reflective
critical attitude" toward the rule that is not present in the case of habits or coercive orders. As others have noted, 24 nothing in this account requires limiting "rules" in Hart's sense to entities that operate
in all-or-nothing fashion. Given group acceptance of a set of goals
that are to be achieved or maintained, behavior that disregards or
accords inappropriate weight to principles reflecting such goals will
evoke reactions evidencing the same "internal aspect" that distinguishes such standards from habits and from orders backed by
threats.
Not all disputes, of course, dissolve at a touch of terminological
clarification. This dispute in particular does not. Whatever the
label, one can purport to distinguish between legal propositions that
do, and those that do not, function in all-or-nothing fashion, giving
the latter the special name of "principles." The clarification does
serve as a warning, however, that one does not attack Hart's position
simply by showing that law includes something other than all-ornothing "rules."25 The essence of Dworkin's argument is, and must
be, not that some principles are law, but that no master test can
capture all the principles that are law.

2.

Isolating the Relevant Distinction

With an eye out for verbal disputes, it is easier to focus directly on the alleged functional or logical distinction between rules
23. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 54-60, 79-88.
24. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 10, at 845.
'
25. At times, Dworkin's argument appears to be of just this sort. For example,
in addition to his argument from the nature of a "hard case," Dworkin employs
an argument based on the problem of precedent and the fact that courts often must
and do overrule prior decisions. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 22-29. In
attempting to account for this phenomenon, the positivist, according to Dworkin,
faces a dilemma similar to that which he faces in attempting to account for judicial
decision in the hard case. The positivist might admit that no judge-made rule is
ever binding on the court, thus abolishing precedent altogether and conceding the
field to the realist. Or, the positivist must say that judges can properly overrule
precedents only in certain cases (e.g., when the prior decision was wrong, when it
has not caused a great deal of reliance, or when it has evoked considerable criticism).
But to limit the power to overrule to these standards is to admit that principles
as well as rules are binding on courts, for that is what such standards amount to.
At most this argument establishes only that there are some legal principles, a
conclusion that need not trouble Hart. Because his use of "rule" does not confine
him to Dworkin's all-or-nothing meaning, Hart could admit that the tests for over-
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and principles. 26 For purpose of clarity, let us talk of the latter as
operating in "flexible," as opposed to "automatic," fashion. Given a
particular legal standard, what is the key to determining which way
the standard operates?
One possibility is that the key is to be discovered by inspecting the
standard itself. Where the standard is vague, prohibiting, for example, "unreasonable uses of the park" or "unreasonable restraints of
trade," it might be thought that the standard operates flexibly; one
determines what is "unreasonable" by considering the full range of
goals served or disserved by a particular activity, and by assigning
weights to resolve conflicts. Dworkin, however, insists that words like
"reasonable" and "unjust" make rules "more like principles," but do
not turn them into principles. This is so because "even the least
confining of those terms restricts the kind of other principles and
policies on which the rule depends." 27 It is conceivable, for example,
that "unreasonable" restraints of trade should still be permissible because of other policies-a result that is forbidden if the standard is a
rule, but not if it is a principle. 28
This position is puzzling in part because of Dworkin's suggestion
that words like "unreasonable" must always be interpreted to restrict
the potential policies that bear on the determination of "unreasonableness." It may be that the actual standards that Dworkin has in mind
do, in fact, reflect a prior determination that the vague antecedent
conditions of the rule refer only to a limited range of policies. But
that is a matter to be determined not by a priori inspection of the
standard, but only by taking account of other evidence concerning
how the standard is to be treated. There may, for example, be a
general provision in the legal system prohibiting broad delegation or
judicial exercise of legislative power. But more important than one's
explanation of this particular puzzle is what this discussion reveals
about the real distinction between rules and principles: One determines whether a standard is a rule or a principle by paying attention
to explicit or implicit directions accompanying the standard (to which
the language may be a guide) that indicate how the standard is to
function. A standard is a rule, however vague, if it embraces a
ruling are "principles," and still preserve his master-test theory simply by adding
them (having limited them in number to a finite class) to the rule of recognition.
26. Henceforth, I shall use "standards" to include broadly all norms of whatever
kind, with "legal standards" embracing (in Dworkin's sense) both legal "rules" and
legal "principles." In this respect, I follow Raz's terminology. See Raz, supra note
10, at 824 n.4.
27. -See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 29 (emphasis original).
28. See id. at 28-29; Social Rules, supra note 3, at 889-90.
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limited range of principles and policies that are taken to be exclusively
relevant. The rule then operates "automatically" by definition:
Conduct measured by the set of principles made relevant by the
rule cannot escape the resulting evaluation by appeal to non-relevant,
excluded principles. Conversely, a standard whose antecedent conditions are quite specific ("any activity that results in a noise level
exceeding fifty decibels") will nonetheless be a principle if accompanying directions make clear that the standard merely constitutes
one consideration (set in this case at a specific threshold level) that
inclines toward prohibition but that must be balanced against other
considerations before legal consequences are attached to challenged
conduct.
Rules, in short, exhibit the following features: (1) They do not
lose their status as rules simply because one must refer to the underlying policies or purposes in order to decide how the rule is to be
applied in a particular case (e.g., what is an "unreasonable" restraint
of trade); and (2) rules differ from principles only because they are
interpreted to make legally irrelevant any other principles or purposes
except those underlying the rule. If this analysis is correct, the
"rule-principle" distinction seems useful at best only after the fact, as
a label for the conclusion that certain standards alone are relevant in
deciding a case. 29
This discussion may explain why commentators have found
Dworkin's treatment of a case like Riggs misleading. 30 Dworkin
describes the case as if the court's decision-that a murderer will not
be permitted to inherit under his victim's will-cannot be explained
by reference to the "rule" governing inheritance, but only by reference to a principle ("no man should profit from his own wrong").
But if the decision is correct, one can account for it in either of two
ways. The first possibility is that the rule governing inheritance did
not, in fact, preclude reference to the "no-profit" principle as one of
the policies underlying the rule. According to this view, the court in
Riggs did no more than a court does in deciding what is "unreasonable" under a rule employing that term. The only difference is that in
Riggs the explicit language of the inheritance standard would not seem
to leave as much room for an underlying "no-profit" principle as
would a rule employing the term "unreasonable." Thus the court
29. See Tapper, supra note 10, at 630. Among arguments by others who have
also questioned the utility of the rule-principle distinction, Professor Tapper's concise
analysis in particular merits careful scrutiny.
30. See, e.g., Christie, supra note 10, at 660-67; Note, Understanding the Model
of Rules, 81 YALE L.J. 912, 921-34 (1972).
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must rely, as it did in Riggs, on implicit indicia of intent to discover
this particular policy-embracing qualification of the literal language.
Alternatively, one may explain the result by construing the inheritance standard as a principle to be balanced against 'others, including
the "no-profit" principle, to decide who inherits under wills. The
fact that, in most cases, results coincide with what the inheritance
standard seems to require would only be evidence of the standard's
great weight, sufficient to overcome the weight of purportedly countervailing considerations in all but the rarest cases, with Riggs being
one of the rarities. 31
This potential for rationalizing any set of results under a legal
standard by characterizing the standard either as a principle or a rule
reenforces doubts about the functional utility of the distinction. If
the only controlling question is whether standard "A" (thei "noprofit" maxim) is legally relevant in determining the applicability of
standard "B," ( the inheritance statute), and if that question is settled
by reference to implicit authorization concerning how "B" is to be
treated, then one might as well dispense with the distinction and move
directly to the question of authorization. 82

3.

The Relevance of the Distinction

Whatever the real distinction between rules and principles, one
may wonder what difference the difference makes. Why make the
distinction in the first place? Dworkin's reason for making the
distinction is to show that the positivist's master test for law is
inadequate. 33 This suggests that the value of the distinction can be
ascertained by asking whether the claimed inability of the positivist's
model to accommodate all legal principles is in some way a consequence of the "flexibility" of principles.
It often appears that this is what Dworkin means to say-indeed, that this is the very reason for his focusing so closely on the
feature of flexibility as opposed to automatic operation. In fact,
however, Dworkin's argument does not depend on the distinction.
Principles cannot be captured in a master test, we are told, because
(1) they exhibit no unifying feature that would allow their generation
31. Neither explanation, it should be noted, is Dworkin's. The crucial question
of how principles can coexist and interact with rules in a case like Riggs, if one
accepts, Dworkin's definition of these two kinds of standards, has never been adequately explained. See Tapper, supra note 10, at 630.
32. Dworkin continues to defend the rule-principle distinction, but claims that
the distinction could be abandoned without giving up the attack on positivism. See
Social Rules, supra note 3, at 882-90.
33. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 22.
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from a single formula and (2) they are too controversial, numerous,
and changing for an exhaustive listing. Neither characteristic is a
consequence of flexibility. Theoretically, a group might accept numerous, continually changing rules that exhibit no unifying feature.
In that case, too, no advance test could capture all the group's laws. 34
The critical premise in Dworkin's argument is simply ,the claim that
there are a large number of unrelated legal standards that are independently accepted as law and that can be discovered only by inspecting the current practices of lawyers, judges, and the public: "The
origin of these as legal principles lies not in a particular decision of
some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed
in the profession and the public over time. " 35 It is this fact of
spontaneous, independent growth that makes it possible to deny the
existence of an advance test for law; whether the standard itself is .a
rule or a principle is not essential to the argument.
B.

On Running Out of Rules: Hard Cases, Easy Cases and Really
Hard Cases.

The critical claim in Dworkin's argument, then, is that some legal
standards, like Topsy, just grow. The rule-principle distinction is of
little use in either explaining this phenomenon or in drawing the line
between those standards that can and those that cannot be captured
by the positivist's master test. One way to focus on the assumptions
on which the critical claim is based is to examine more carefully the
notion of a "hard case"-the decisional context that gives rise in the
first place to the alleged counterexample to the positivist's theory.
What exactly is a "hard case," and what requires the positivist in such
cases to admit that his model provides no legal standards to control
the judge's decision? 36
One possibility is that the term "hard cases" refers to real gaps or
34. The possibility that rules as well as principles can undermine the positivist's
theory is illustrated by Dworkin's account of custom and customary rules. Like his
principles, these rules too have simply developed into acceptance without the need
for prior legislative or judicial enactment. They are binding, and hence "law," not
because they are valid under some master test, but because-like the master test
itself-they are simply accepted as binding. -See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at
44.- Because there are not as many of these customary rules, Dworkin concedes
that this is only a "chip" in the master-test theory. Id. •But the "chip" here is,
in theory, the same kind of "hole" that Dworkin claims he has found in the case
of principles.
35. Id. at 41.
36. For one of the few explorations of the notion of a "hard case" in this context, see Perry, Judicial Method and the Concept of Reasoning, 80 ETlilcs 1, 36 & n.4 (1969). See also Gross, Jurisprudence, 1968/69 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L.
575, 576-77; Note, supra note 30, at 921-34.
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lacunae in a legal system, in the sense that legal standards fail to say
anything at all about whether challenged conduct is permitted or
prohibited. 37 The suggestion, however, that municipal legal systems
in general, and the American legal system in particular, include "open
spaces" of this sort is not at all an obvious one. Whatever the
situation in international faw, municipal legal systems are generally
thought to have "closed" themselves by including "some kind of
residual principle the effect of which is to occupy the space which
would otherwise be devoid of law."38 The most common such
principle, dubbed the "residual negative principle" by Professor Julius Stone, provides "that everything which is not legally prohibited is
deemed to be legally permitted."39 This principle, of course, can
easily be included in the positivist's rule of recognition. If one views
the legal system as including such a standard, it might then seem
wrong to describe Riggs and the privacy case as examples, on the
positivist's model, of situations where there is no applicable law. If
there really is no standard prohibiting invasions of privacy, then the
law would necessarily be that such activity is legally permitted. As
for Riggs, either the law is that testators' wishes are always
respected-even in the case of the beneficiary who has murdered the
testator-or the law itself provides an exception for the homicidal
legatee. For reasons similar to those that cast doubt on the functional
utility of the rule-principle distinction, Riggs is not a case for which
there is "no law," but simply one in which it is difficult to discover
just what the law is.
Although a variation of this argument appears in the literature,40
it fails as an attack on Dworkin's position. Dworkin need not, and, as
far as I can tell, does not claim that the positivist must run into real
gaps in the sense described above. Even assuming that the American
legal system is closed, the positivist's test, according to Dworkin,
would not be capable of determining in some cases whether challenged conduct is in fact legally prohibited. This determination is a
prerequisite to following the further closure instructions contained in
the residual negative principle. 41 Dworkin's concern is not with the
logical ability to formulate a rule post hoc for every case, but with the
more troublesome problem of explaining how one moves from pre37. It is in this sense that scholars debate whether a non-liquet can exist under
international law. See Stone, "Non Liquet" and the Function of Law in the International Community, 35 BRIT. Y.B. OF INTL. L. 124 (1959).
38. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS REASONING 189 (1964).
39. Id.
40. See Note, supra note 30, at 924-27.
41. Cf. Stone, supra note 37, at 134.
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existing standards ("no vehicles in the park") to the new formulation
in the case to be decided ("no go-karts in the park"). In Dworkin's
view the move is always by way of pre-existing legal standards. If
the positivist believes that the only standards he is able to identify
(the "no-vehicle" statute) will not determine the result, he should
cast his net on another side to yield a catch that will.
This account suggests a second possible meaning for "hard
case": Rz'ggs is a hard case just because a judge must tum to
something beyond the bare language of existing, formulated rules
( the inheritance statute) in ·order to discover the result required in the
case. But this definition raises doubts about whether anything remains to fill the role of an "easy case."42 No rule is self-applying in
the sense that it relieves a judge of the need to classify the facts and to
determine whether, thus classified, they fall within the scope of the
rule. The only possible candidate for an "easy case" would appear to
be one in which the correct decision could be determined solely by
reference to the language of the rule and the meaning of its terms,
making reference to other standards (purposes, policies, principles)
unnecessary. Although Hart in the celebrated exchange with Professor Fuller suggests that such cases do exist, 43 he does not suggest that
they are the only cases that yield correct decisions and that all the rest
represent judicial exercises in legislative discretion. The "meanings
of words," writes Hart, "may be controlled by reference to the purpose of a statutory enactment which itself may be explicitly stated or
generally agreed." "[I]t is tempting [but an oversimplification] to
ascribe [agreement in clear cases] simply to the fact that there are
necessarily such agreements in the use of the shared conventions of
language. " 44
42. That the notion of an "easy case" can prove as difficult to pin down in
this context as the contrary notion of a "hard case" should be evident. Hart notes
that "it is a matter of some difficulty to give any exhaustive account of what makes
a 'clear case' clear or makes a general rule obviously and uniquely applicable to
a particular case." Hart, 6 ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY 264, supra note 11, at 270. For
an example of an elaborate and otherwise intriguing thesis, the plausibility and non•
triviality of which, however, depend largely on the unexamined notion of what it
means for legal standards to be "perfectly clearly applicable to particular situations,"
see Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STlJD. 351, 354 (1973) (judges even in
"easy cases" may not be able to avoid substantive input into the decision).
43. Compare Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 11 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 607 (1958), with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 661-69 (1958). For a plausible interpretation of Hart's theory of meaning in this context that does not require excluding
implicit reference to purpose even in cases appearing to fall within the "standard
instance" or "core of meaning" of a term, see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECI•
SION 180 n.29 (1961).
44. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 11, at 271.
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If the solution of easy cases also requires reference beyond the

language of the rule to the rule's purpose, then either this feature
cannot by itself be the distinguishing mark of cases that purportedly
cause the positivist trouble, or Dworkin's argument that the positivist
cannot account for all relevant legal standards should apply to judicial
decisions in all cases, easy as well as hard. Consider the second
alternative. How does the fact that judges must take account of
purpose as well as language in at least some, and perhaps all, easy
cases affect the positivist's model? Must the positivist not be prepared
to identify and count as "law" under his model both the verbal fonnulation of the legal standard and whatever purposes or principles determine its correct application?
On this issue, it must be admitted, writers in the positivist tradition have not always been in agreement. 45 The apparent relative ease
with which the verbal formulation of a standard can be identified, in
contrast to the difficulty of isolating the standard's "purpose," has
tempted theorists to count as "law" only the objectively certain starting point represented by the statute itself. The transition from statute
to decision in a particular case is then explained as an aspect of legal
reasoning rather than of the concept of law or of legal validity. 46 But
this view cannot easily escape indictment as essentially definition by
fiat. Legal reasoning, deductive only in a trivial sense, is primarily a
matter of determining relevant similarities and differences among fact
situations that distinguish cases covered by a standard from cases that
are not. If the critical question of relevance is in fact determined by
the explicit or implicit purpose of the statute, it seems wholly arbitrary to designate only the statute as "legal." More importantly, there
is no need for the positivist to be concerned that counting purpose as
law in such cases will impair his master test model. By hypothesis,
we are dealing with cases in which the same master test that picks out
the rule also picks out the "explicitly stated or generally agreed"
45. Hart himself has been less than clear on this issue, although one can suggest
a consistent interpretation of his writings that has Hart considering "purpose" to
be law in "easy," but not in "penumbral," cases. Compare Hart, supra note 43,
at 614, with Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, supra note 11, at 271. Much
depends, even under this interpretation, on just what is meant by a "penumbral case."
See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 17 YALE L.J. 411, 4Hi-24 (1968).
It is not clear, for example, that the only cases in which Hart would agree that a
uniquely correct decision exists are those that are "easy" in the literal sense. See
R. WASSERSI'ROM, supra note 43, at 180 n.30. "Easy case" is thus as much a term of
art for present purposes as "hard case," with neither term necessarily tied to the
ordinary language meaning of "difficult." Cf. Sartorius, The Justification of the
Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS 171, 186 n.3 (1968).
46. See Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, 1326-28 (1969);
cf. Bingham, What ls the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-25, 109-21 (1912).
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purpose, in light of which the rule is to be interpreted and applied.47
If the positivist's model can accommodate purpose in this manner,
we must find additional characteristics of the "hard case" if we are to
explain its distinctive and problematic character. Because the dispute is over the degree of discretion judges have, it may help to recall
why Hart suggests that judges must sometimes legislate. For Hart,
the explanation lies in empirical truths about the nature of language
and the limits of human ability both to anticipate factual developments and to know precisely what one's aims are in creating legal
standards. 48 Far from denying the reality of these limitations, Dworkin builds on them. A model of law that captures only legal standards reflected in the shared conventions of language and purpose
will require the judge to legislate when those conventions reach the
described limits. Thus the "hard case" for Dworkin is what might be
called the "really hard case": the decision that must be reached on the
basis of standards that, by definition, lead to results inherently unconventional, inherently controversial, and inherently incapable of
producing "interpersonal checks"49 as respects the substantive correctness of the result.

II.

THE

OBLIGATION OF A JUDGE

Confronted with standards beyond those obvious in purpose and
rule, the positivist, says Dworkin, has two choices. He must either
claim that such standards are only discretionary and hence not legally
binding, or he may concede their binding status and argue that he
identifies them as legal standards through reference, in some more
complex way, to his theoretical master test. 50
There is, however, a third possibility. The positivist might admit
that some standards bind judges but explain that they play a role in
the legal system sufficiently different from that of ordinary rules and
principles to justify excluding them from the class of standards encompassed by the concept of "law." This position makes irrelevant
the question whether such standards could be captured in advance by
a master test: Even if "capture-proof," they would constitute no
defect in a theoretical model designed to capture only legal standards.
41. See Hughes, supra note 45, at 423-24.
48. See CoNCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 120-24, 131-32.
49. The term is used by Perry, who suggests that it is the possibility of achieving
"interpersonal checks" among experts that distinguishes rationality in the formal
and empirical sciences from attempts at rational justification of judicial decisions
in "hard cases." See Perry, supra note 36, at 14-15; R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 184.
50. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 874.
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Dworkin insists that arguments of this sort can only beg the question
in the present context because they assume the very distinction between legal and other kinds of standards that the positivist's rule of
recognition is designed to establish. 51
The aim of the present section is twofold: first, to develop the
suggested distinction between two kinds of standards that bind
judges, and, second, to consider whether all standards that bind judges
must necessarily be deemed "legal" standards. In one sense, Dworkin is correct that the controversy at this point threatens to become
merely verbal. But there is another, more important sense in which
the difference between these kinds of standards appears sufficiently
basic to justify ( as more illuminating) a model of law that preserves,
rather than dissolves, the distinction.
A.

The Standards That Bind

At least some of Dworkin's principles exhibit one feature in
particular that might seem to distinguish them from other legal standards. Principles appear to function in the first instance as guides to
the judge in deciding what rules require and only secondarily as guides
to a citizen's conduct. They seem to guide conduct, if at all, not by
directly declaring what is and is not permitted, but only in the indirect
sense of informing an individual that certain principles and policies
will be considered by courts in determining what a rule requires. 52
This decision-guiding, rather than conduct-guiding, feature is most
obvious in the case of principles of statutory construction. It also
appears to be true, though perhaps less clearly, of such judicial
maxims and principles as "no man shall profit from his own
wrong." If principles are controversial, and if equally applicable
principles may conflict with one another within the context of the
same decision, it is somewhat strained to suggest that principles guide
primary conduct in the same way that rules do. 53
By itself, however, this decision-guiding characteristic will not
justify a refusal to call all such standards "law." We have agreed,
after all, that "purposes" must and can be admitted by the positivist to
be among a system's legal standards, even though such purposes may
also perform a similar decision-guiding function. If a statute prohibiting vehicles in the park is known to be aimed exclusively at promoting an energy conservation ethic, rather than at the preservation of
51. See id. at 871, 882-90.
52. See Note, supra note 30, at 940. See also note 85 infra.
53. This conclusion receives some support from Dworkin's own description of
principles. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 26.
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peace and quiet, and if that difference in purpose leads to differences
in interpretation and application, then the purpose guides conduct as
well as decision for the same basic reason: It supplements the
meaning of the term "vehicle" in boderline cases to indicate to judge
and citizen alike just what it is that has been proscribed.
The decision-guiding function does suggest, however, a possible
further refinement in the classification of standards that bind
judges-one that the following rough analogy will serve to introduce.
Scientists and philosophers of science devote considerable effort to the
attempt to isolate acceptable "principles of induction" to serve as
guides or tests for determining when one may properly claim to have
discovered a "law" of science. 54 In this context it has become
commonplace to distinguish the principles governing the accepted
methodology from the substantive results of applying the methodthat is, from the scientific "laws" that govern particular events.
Would both the accepted methodological principles and the substantive rules in this case count as scientific "laws"? In one sense
perhaps they would. Accepted principles of induction might be
viewed as themselves stating true laws about, for example, the nature
of knowledge and how it is acquired. The scientific community would
expect its members to heed these principles as well as already established scientific laws in deciding whether a given hypothesis was,
in fact, a "law." But more important than the fact that both types of
standards are in this sense "binding" is the fact that the methodological and substantive standards apply to areas of human inquiry that in
important respects are worth distinguishing.
In similar fashion, some standards in the legal context may be
viewed as analogous to rules for proper scientific induction because
they arise out of the investigation of a subject matter that is, in
important ways, distinct from that with which typical legal standards
are concerned. The subject matter of the former is not the regulation
of human behavior in a particular society through the prescription of
norms, but the regulation of any rational attempt to apply standards
or to interpret human communications. If principles can be ascribed
some such trans-legal status-in the sense that they are not peculiarly
legal-then the claim that they are binding may be accepted, not
because they are "law," but because they constitute minimally essential criteria for the proper conduct of certain types of rational activity.
Such principles become clues, not to what "the law" requires, but to
54. See generally R. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRoBABILl1Y (2d ed.
1962); N. GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST (1955); G. VON WRIGIIT, A
'TREATISE ON INDUCTION AND PROBABILl1Y (1951).
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what the concept of "rationality" or "judging" requires. To the
extent that legal systems require officials to be "judges," one discovers
what that role entails, not only by inspecting particular provisions of
the legal system (polling the system's officials to determine what they
contingently happen to accept), but also by paying attention simply
to what it means to apply standards rationally in a sense that transcends the particular context in which the role is assumed.
Which standards are candidates for such translegal status and what
characteristics identify them? Our description of them as standards
implicit in the concept of "judging" provides a starting point for
answering the second half of the question: Standards binding on a
judge are to be distinguished from legal standards if they are immune
from deliberate change in the sense that an instruction to an official to
ignore them makes the official no longer a "judge." While the task of
defining the concept of judging may not be easier than the task of
defining the concept of law, my only purpose at present is to suggest
that some standards fall into this category, whether or not we can
identify them all. They would include those principles referring to
"characteristic judicial virtues" that Hart identifies as "impartiality
and neutrality in surveying the alternatives, consideration for the
interest of all who will be affected, and a concern that some acceptable
general principle be deployed as a reasoned basis for decision." 55
They would also include, perhaps as a particular illustration of the
last-named virtue, the principle of non-contradiction, reflected in the
requirement that "like cases be treated alike." Dworkin insists that
judges are subject to a strong requirement of "articulate consistency."56 The source of the obligation even for Dworkin is not apparently the law, but a "doctrine of political responsibility."57 It is not
clear, however, that Dworkin means to suggest that the obligation is
only "political," and thus subject to cultural variation or normative
dispute, rather than, as the writings of Professor Lon Fuller suggest,
an essential aspect of the concept of adjudication itself. 58 If to
instruct judges to decide cases by flipping coins is to make them no
longer judges, but agents of a legislative determination that any
decision, right or wrong, is better than none, 59 it is hard to see that
55. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 200.
56. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1064.
57. Id.
58. See L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1959) (unpublished
paper prepared for the Roundtable on Jurisprudence, Association of American Law
Schools); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3.
59. See H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process 666 (tent. ed. 1958) (unpublished).
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one does less violence to the concept of adjudication by instructing
judges to ignore the demand for articulate consistency.
The process of distinguishing these standards (let us call them
judicial technique principles) from other legal standards may be
illustrated by considering one particular group of such
standards: the maxims of statutory construction. Despite the tendency to debunk canons of construction as effectively cancelling each
other, one may agree with H. M. Hart and Sacks that they at least
perform the "useful function" of indicating "linguistically permissible" meanings, with final selection left to context. 00 In this respect,
such maxims perform nicely the role Dworkin assigns to principles: They point, however weakly, in one direction while still
leaving final results to await a complete stocktaking of all such
pointers. Dworkin, in any event, appears explicitly to include such
"techniques of statutory construction" among his putatively troublecausing principles. 61 It is not necessary to canvass in depth elaborate
textbook listings and discussions of these maxims in order to make
the point that the source of many of them lies in "logic and common
sense" 62 rather than in the contingently accepted norms of a particular society. This is particularly evident in the case of the three most
commonly cited canons: noscitur a sociis, ejusdam generis, and
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 63 The fact that standard treatises,
themselves venerable, reach this conclusion about the commonsense origin of hoary Latin maxims64 is a testament not so much to the
early emergence of such principles in Anglo-American law, as to their
fundamental link to the prerequisites of rational interpretation in any
context and in any society. As such they are easily viewed, not as
peculiarly legal principles, but as principles belonging to a "science of
hermeneutics" that prescribes a methodology for interpretation in
general, whether the subject be suicide notes, Dead Sea scrolls, wills
or statutes:
[W]e shall find that the same rules which common sense teaches
every one to use, in order to understand his neighbor in the most
trival intercourse, are necessary likewise, although not sufficient, for
the interpretation of documents and texts of the highest importance,
constitutions as well as treaties between the greatest nations. 66
60. Id. at 1221.
61. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 42.
62. BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS 453 (10th ed. 1939).
63. See H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W.J. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 903 (1973).
64. See J. SumERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 4916 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
65. F. LIE.BER, LEGAL AND PoLmCAL HBRMBNBUllCS 17-18 (3d ed. 1880).
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Not all such maxims, however, will appear to exhibit the suggested
identifying feature of immunity from deliberate change. Maxims
directing strict construction of criminal statutes or of statutes in
derogation of the common law, for example, appear context-specific
to particular legal systems in ways apparently open to cultural variation. To explain why some of these precepts might nevertheless be
viewed as standards arising out of the role of judge qua judge rather
than out of the peculiarly legal standards of the system in which one
occupies that role requires a further distinction between the concrete
shape a principle has assumed in a particular legal society and the
abstract "principle of interpretation" it represents. The abstract
principle that the common-law derogation maxim represents may be
phrased in some such manner as the following: "Assume settled practices and expectations have not been radically and deliberately altered,
unless . . . ( the context, language, other principles so indicate)."
The concrete form of the abstract principle is context-specific to a
common-law jurisdiction, but the abstract principle is not. It is a
common sense guide to rational interpretation that would normally
be accepted in any context. Its justification lies in assumptions about
human behavior that are grounded in reason and experience and that
transcend particular community norms. One who intends sharply
to change known, accepted patterns of behavior will normally take
care to make his instructions precise; where instructions are imprecise,
he probably did not intend the radical interpretation.
Having made this distinction, one may still be unpersuaded that
deliberate countermand of the common-law derogation maxim, however clear its origin in common sense, would essentially undermine
the concept of judging in those cases where the maxim would otherwise apply. No less eminent an authority than Holmes, for example,
urged that the maxim be eliminated from American jurisprudence, 66
and numerous state legislatures have in fact enacted statutes specifically purporting to abrogate it. 67 For the most part, however, these
attacks appear to have been leveled at misuse of the canon-at
judicial decisions that found the canon to be more than simply the
abstract principle of interpretation described above. Such decisions
implicitly viewed the canon as reflecting a substantive principle of
power allocation between legislature and judiciary that gave the latter
institution control over development of the common law in the face of
66. See Holmes, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 386-88
(1908).
67. For a survey of such states and resulting court reaction, see Fordham &
Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VANP. L.
REV. 438, 448-53 (1950).
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superior, countervailing indicia of intended legislative change. But if
one restricts the role of the maxim to the minimum function described
by the abstract principle of interpretation, it then becomes difficult to reconcile legislative abrogation with a continued expectation
that the court perform an exclusively judicial role in cases where the
maxim would otherwise apply. One might even have difficulty
knowing how to comply with an instruction that no presumption,
however weak, should henceforth be made in favor of interpretations
that more nearly accord with prior, accepted practice. 08 If the
instruction is viewed as tantamount to a direction not to use common
sense in interpreting communications-"do not assume the legislator
in communicating directives acts as experience indicates most rational
people do"-it becomes doubtful whether the "interpreting" official
remains a "judge" any more than he would when acting on an
instruction to resolve doubtful cases by flipping a coin. 00
Contrast the second maxim mentioned above-that "criminal statutes should be strictly construed." Here it is difficult to see how our
suggested identifying feature-immunity from deliberate changewould justify assigning the maxim binding but translegal status. If
the abstract principle represented is thought to reflect solely a policy of
providing fair notice concerning acts that will result in criminal
sanctions, then it can be discovered only by inspecting community or
legal norms concerning fairness, not judicial norms concerning techniques of rule interpretation and application. If a particular community decided no longer to value fair warning in issuing and enforcing
criminal statutes, the maxim could be intelligibly and deliberately
countermanded. One could establish a translegal status for such a
68. Presumably, prior practice is maintained, despite the instruction, until it is
overturned by statutes. Some statutes will intend "sharp" changes and some will
not, with the line between the two, despite the instruction, still marked (in part)
by language that avoids ambiguity. Cf. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573,
111 P.2d 800 (1941) (adhering to previous "strict" construction of statute in derogation of common law despite intervening legislative reversal of derogation canon).
The only context in which repeal of presumptions of any kind in favor of established
practices might be understandable is one in which it appears that the law-making
institution thereby intends total disavowal of the relevance of existing practices as
"background" against which to understand and interpret future directives, as in the
case of a postrevolutionary committee. Even in that case, however, one can probably explain different interpretations of apparently identical pre- and postrevolutionary directives simply by noting, if true, that fundamental changes in societal goals
have led to "other indicia" of intent or purpose that outweigh presumptions in favor
of continuity. Only if one thinks it is possible "rationally" to declare irrelevant
all respects in which background human behavior converges, can one strip the presumption of all weight, leaving judges to interpret on a totally clean slate.
69. Cf. H.M. Hart, & A.M. Sacks, supra note 59, at 1240 (a "statute ought always to be presumed to be the work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably").
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maxim only to the extent one views it as reflecting an abstract
principle of interpretation rather than substantive community goalsfor example, "communicators who intend serious consequences to
attach to actions will avoid ambiguity; where they did not avoid, they
probably did not intend."
B.

Whether All That Binds Is Law

Does a refusal to include among a society's "legal standards"
those principles that are immune from deliberate change in the sense
described amount simply to a verbal dispute, a definition of law "by
fiat"? 70 Dworkin rejects out-of-hand any attempt to explain the obligation to take principles into account
as a matter of judicial "craft," or something of that sort. The question will still remain why this type of obligation (whatever we call
it) is different from the obligation that rules impose upon judges, and
why it entitles us to say that principles and policies are not part of
the law but are merely extra-legal standards "courts characteristically
use." 71

The above discussion essays an answer to this question based on
differences in the source and character of judicial technique principles
corresponding to the difference between standards that bind a judge
qua judge and those that bind qua judge of a particular legal system.72
In one sense, of course, Dworkin is correct. Because the role of
judge is itself assigned by the law, principles implicit in the concept of
judging become incorporated in the legal system by reference. Furthermore, if judicial technique principles are too numerous to list and
too unrelated to be generated from a formula, as we have assumed for
purposes of argument,73 then it must be false to claim that "some
70. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 37.
71. Id. at 36.'
72. By suggesting that standards can bind "qua judge," I mean to imply that
judging occurs in nonlegal contexts and that, in all such contexts, observance of
a core of common minimal standards makes it appropriate to speak of the official
engaged in the activity as a judge, whether it be of beauty contests, see Greenawalt,
supra note 10, at 368-69, of games, compare CoNCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at
138-41, with Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 629, or of the law. I do not mean
to deny that judges in legal systems may also be obliged to heed additional standards of judging technique that are peculiar to their role as legal judges. See Hughes,
supra note 45, at 414-16.
In its broadest sense, "judging" need not be confined to acts of officials resolving
disputes but may include any attempt of an individual to reach and justify decisions
(make "judgments") under standards. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 33 (sergeant told to "pick the five most experienced men" for a patrol). In this sense,
what the text refers to as standards implicit in the concept of judging might be characterized equally well as standards implicit in the concept of rationality. Cf. Perry,
supra note 36.
73. If one thinks that judicial technique principles can be easily listed or other-
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social rule or set of social rules exists within the community of [a
nation's] judges and legal officials, which rules settle the limits of the
judge's duty to recognize any other rules or principle as law." 74
If all of this is conceded, in what sense could one continue to
defend a model of law that ignored judicial technique principles in
the account it gave of legal validity? The answer lies in part in the
characteristics implied by the shared identifying feature of immunity
from deliberate change. It is the peculiar characteristic of principles
identified by this feature that they can be constructed in advance by
an external observer, bent on determining "the laws" of a particular
legal system, without regard for empirical questions concerning the
existence or content of any legal standard in the society, including the
rule of recognition. It is this claimed universality and independence
of judicial technique principles that justifies excluding such standards
in a model designed primarily to isolate a society's particular legal
norms. Exclusion is justified for much the same reasons that one
would not include the rules of grammar or language of the society in a
model of "law," even though these too would be "binding'' on a judge
responsive to his obligation to understand and apply the signs used to
convey legal standards.
Another way of making the point is to note that we are doing no
more than separating a judge's obligation "to apply the law" into its
constituent parts: the obligation (1) "to apply" (2) "the law." The
second half is what the positivist's model is designed to reflect. The
first half-the realm of standards that determine acceptable methods
of interpreting and applying other standards and of deciding particular cases under such standards-is not the peculiar concern of the
legal theorist. It is the concern as well of the theorist in any discipline,
from philosophy to science, who must deal with the perplexing problems involved in the characterization and classification of fact situations and the justification of decisions under standards. 75 One need
not deny that real diferences may exist in the concept of rationality as
it applies to these various disciplines in order to affirm that there is a
common core that conscientious judges must heed for reasons quite
wise captured, the positivist could, of course, save his model without recourse to
the argument in this section. I ignore this possibility because Dworkin apparently
treats these standards as among the principles that cannot be so captured and because the distinction urged in this section seems to me worth preserving even if
other arguments for the positivist might also be made.
14. Social Rules, supra note 3, at 869; see id. at 874. That the social rule thesis
quoted in the text may be a stronger claim than the positivist need make is noted
below. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
75. Cf. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 43, at 32.
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different from those that explain why judges must also heed the
standards identified by a contingently accepted rule of recognition.
The plea, in short, is for a distinction, also urged by others, 76
between the concept of legal reasoning and the concept of legal
validity. Dworkin suggests that the question "What, in general is a
good reason for decision by a court of law?" is in every respect simply
another way of asking "What is Law?" 77 The view presented here
declines as misleading this invitation to collapse all questions concerning how courts ought to decide cases into questions of what the law is.
This viewpoint also explains why Hart might write an entire book on
the concept of law and explicitly set aside, as a matter "that cannot be
attempted here," the characterization of "the varied types of reasoning
which courts characteristically use . . . ." 78 It may be that of these
two, the inquiry into legal reasoning is the more urgent and of more
immediate, practical effect than the conceptual study of legal validity.
It may even be that the perceived barrenness of conceptual theories of
law in general justifies a view that finds more fertile possibilities in
the American realist movement,79 whatever the conceptual flaws of the
legal theory produced by that movement. 80 But these normative
evaluations are beside the point when the question concerns potential
defects in the conceptual enterprise upon which Hart, after all, chose
to embark.
The importance of distinguishing what are here called judicial
technique principles does not, however, lie solely in the implications
of the distinction for an adequate conceptual model of law. The
distinction has implications as well for questions concerning the
responsibility of individual judges to develop and correct such principles within an existing legal system. In the case of legal standards,
individual judges who disagree with the justice or wisdom of the
accepted rule of recognition do not breach-and indeed can only
acquit-their duty qua judge by applying such standards. On the
positivist's model, compliance with accepted standards is compliance
with official duty. In contrast, official acceptance of particular
judicial technique principles has no necessary connection to questions
concerning the correctness of such standards and the obligation of a
judge to employ them. An individual judge demonstrates compliance with official duty as respects these principles, not by pointing to
the fact of convergent peer behavior, but only by pointing to the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Hughes, supra note 45, at 433.
Dworkin, Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision, 15 Ennes 47 (1964).
CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 144.
See Hughes, supra note 45, at 437-39.
~ee CoNCEPT OF LAw, supra note 2, at 143.
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correctness in fact of the judicial technique principles he employs.
And in establishing such correctness, the search for guidance must
ultimately be directed well beyond the community of legal officials to
the wider community of rational rule-appliers.
That much needs to be done in further characterizing and identifying such principles may be conceded. 81 The point of the present
discussion is only to stress that, to the extent the judge's role is that of
a rational rule-applier, the resulting implications for role theory
should not be subsumed under legal theory in a way that obscures
real differences in the nature and source of judicial obligation. 82
Llewellyn's elaborate exploration of "rule, tool and technique"83 in
the process of judicial decision should not, under the rights thesis, be
converted into an exploration of exclusively legal standards: rule
and tool perhaps, but not technique. •
C.

The Limits of the Argument

Even if the above distinction is accepted, it will constitute a
complete response to Dworkin's argument only if it can be applied to
all of the principles Dworkin has in mind. Consider the principle
that "no man should profit from his own wrong." On its face, this at
least appears to be a standard unrelated to any independently developed methodology of rule-discovery that might be thought to transcend the realm of the peculiarly legal. Dworkin suggests that we
can imagine the standard being changed or eroded "[i]f it no longer
seemed unfair to allow people to profit by their wrongs. " 84 Can one
justify a refusal to count this standard as law by a process similar to
that applied to judicial technique principles?
81. See Hughes, supra note 45, at 439 & n.22. It may be that there are characteristics other than those suggested in this section that more appropriately identify
the full class of judicially binding standards deserving of exclusion from the class
of "legal standards." My primary concern is to describe the general nature of this
class of standards and to justify its separation from inquiries into legal validity.
The leading reference point for studies characterizing what is peculiar and essential to the process of adjudication is still largely found in the writings of Professor
Fuller. See sources cited note 58 supra; H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, supra note 59,
at 662-69. For a thoughtful application of Fuller's model to questions of legal theory, see Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. BAR REV. 406
(1968).
82. Philosophers and sociologists have long explored the extent to which obligations attach to, and define, roles, see, e.g., R. DAHRBNDORF, EssAYS IN THE THEORY
OF SocIE'IY 19-87 (1968), and this literature is to some extent reflected in discussions
of legal theory and legal reasoning, see Weiler, supra note 81, at 407 n.3 (1968),
See also Seidman, The Judicial Process Reconsidered in the Light of Role-Theory,
32 Moo. L. RBv. 516 (1969).
83, See K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS 402
(1960).
84. Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41.
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The attempt to do so might take the following form. First, one
might question whether in fact the "no-profit" principle could be
disavowed as Dworkin suggests. If the principle is a concrete illustration of some more abstract principle, linking notions of right and
wrong with notions of just desert ("good should be rewarded, evil
punished"), the suggestion that the principle could have no weight at
all in community judgments about "fairness" borders on a redefinition of the underlying normative concepts of "desert," "right,"
"wrong" and "profit." It will always be prima facie unfair to profit
from one's own wrong, even though the prima facie case can sometimes, as in Dworkin's example of adverse possession, be overcome.
Second, even if complete disavowal of the no-profit maxim is logically
possible, it might be argued that the maxim (or the abstract principle
it reflects) operates on such a level of generality that one could
assume implicit acceptance of the principle as an empirical fact in any
relevant social context. In this respect, such principles would resemble judicial technique principl~: They are found not in the confines
of a particular legal institution but in the essential preconditions of
social intercourse in general.
If this hypothesis is correct, one should be able to discover the
"no-profit" maxim and similar principles operating in nonlegal, rulegoverned situations-in games, for example. Consider a referee at a
basketball game played under rules that predate the introduction of
specific provisions for intentional fouls. The generally applicable
rule is that all bodily contact fouls "shall be called." A member of
team A, which is losing in the closing minutes of the game, intentionally fouls the poorest shooter on team B with the hope that team A
will get the rebound if the foul shot is missed. Team B urges that the
rule be construed to allow the referee not to call the foul, thereby
leaving team B with possession of the ball. No other relevant rules
govern the situation, which has not previously arisen. One can
imagine the referee deciding that, although the rules committee had
not envisioned this particular situation, surely it had not intended for
a team to "profit from its own wrong." 85 Whether or not that is the
85. Professor Carrio discusses a similar example involving the "advantage rule"
in soccer, which allows officials to avoid penalizing a team's infraction of a rule
"if, as a consequence of the penalty, the offending side would gain an advantage
and the non-offending side would be adversely affected." G. CARRIO, LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND LEGAL PosmVIsM 6 ( 1971). Carrio uses the example to distinguish between second-order and first-order principles, the former characterized in part by
their "topic neutrality" and in part by the fact that they are addressed to judges
and indicate how other rules are to be understood and applied. But Carrio's secondorder principles appear to include far more than what I have called judicial technique
principles, and both sorts of principles appear for Carrio to be legal standards. See
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conclusion the referee reaches, the claim that he has a duty at least to
consider the "no-profit" principle rests on assumptions about how
critics and players would respond to a failure "to take the measure of
these principles" that are similar to the assumptions Dworkin makes
in arguing for the binding nature of the principle in Riggs. 86 In both
cases a decisionmaker is urged to construe a rule, in the absence of
express contrary indications, not to do violence to implicitly accepted
general social principles. Although in that sense "binding," the
context-neutral nature of such principles might be thought sufficient
to explain why one does not include them specifically among the
"rules of basketball" or the "laws" of society. 87
I do not intend to explore this suggestion further because it seems
clear that, however far one might push this process of distinguishing
trans-legal from legal principles, one cannot in this manner account
id. at 7, 16, 24. Thus the distinction is different both in content and purpose from
the distinction developed in this article.
86. .See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 36.
87. This attempt to extend the argument used in the case of judicial technique
principles can be placed in perspective by briefly comparing the thesis of this section with classical theories of natural law and with Hart's own theory concerning
the "minimum content of natural law." For Hart, natural facts of human vulnerability, desire for survival, and the like, make minimal rules respecting persons, property,
and promises necessary features of all social life. See CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note
2, at 189-95. Legal systems must include such minimal rules, not so they may count
as "legal", but because it is unlikely that such systems could otherwise come into
being or survive. The link here is an empirical one between universal but contingent
truths about human beings on the one hand, and the efficacy, not the concept, of a
legal system on the other. One would hardly be inclined to exclude these minimally
necessary legal standards (which may take various concrete forms in particular
legal systems) from a model of law simply because they appeared only in this
sense in all legal systems. In this respect, the difference between such standards
and judicial technique principles lies in part in the difference in subject matter with
which they deal. Minimal rules concerning persons, property, and promises aim
directly at the control of human conduct, rather than at control of the process of
reasoning from standards to decisions in particular cases. It is the thesis of this
section that the former enterprise, but not the latter, is what "law," even in its
broadest, preanalytic sense, could possibly be said to be "about." Cf. L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (1964). This thesis explains why a model of law
that failed to reflect "the minimum content of natural law" would seem arbitrary
in a way that a model that ignored judicial technique principles would not. For
similar reasons, classical natural law theories, which assert conceptual links between
"law" and substantive principles of justice or morality, would also require that such
principles be included among the "legal standards" identified by legal theory.
The attempt in the text to provide a trans-legal account of principles such as
the "no profit maxim" falls between the Hartian and the classical natural law theories. Like the latter, such principles are not limited to those based on the "natural
necessity" reflected in a Hobbesian view of man's predicament, but embrace broader
principles of fairness and justice generally in social contexts. Like Hart's theory,
the claim that these principles would be universally accepted in any social context
is only contingent, not conceptual. (Indeed the plausibility of even the contingent
claim probably depends on interpreting the principles at a level so abstract that they
threaten to become vacuous.) But like both theories, an attempt to exclude such
substantive standards from a model of "legal standards" begins to appear arbitrary.
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for all, or even most, of the principles that Dworkin has in mind.
Some principles are surely not context-neutral. A principle that
places "special burdens upon oligopolies that manufacture potentially
dangerous machines" 88 derives its authority from standards accepted
within the particular legal institution in much the same manner as
other legal standards. A referee urged to apply the foul rule only to
intentional fouls must consider the purpose and "spirit" of the particular game of basketball (it is not a kind of football or rugby) in order
to reject the proposed interpretation. The fact that one would not
include in the "rules of basketball" all the purposes and aims of the
game that might become relevant to an interpretation of the rules
provides no answer to Dworkin's argument that at least these principles operate functionally like other legal standards to determine results, and thus in that sense are institution-specific standards that
must be included in an accurate theoretical account of the "laws" of
the game or institution.

III.

THE RIGHTS THESIS

What, then, should a judge do when the shared conventions of
language and purpose alone do not point to a single result? Dworkin's answer is that the judge must expand his search beyond •the legal
standards implicit in any particular rule to those implicit in the entire
legal system itself: "A principle is a principle of law if it figures in
the soundest theory of law that can be provided as a justification for
the explicit substantive and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in
question." 80 Professor Sartorius provides a similar but not identical
account: "The correct decision in a given case is that which achieves
'the best resolution' of existing standards in terms of systematic
coherence . . . ." 90
In his most recent article, Dworkin expand~ at length on this
thesis by positing an ideal judge called Hercules. 91 Faced with a
hard constitutional case, Hercules must first develop a "full political
theory that justifies the constitution as a whole." If several political
theories satisfy this test, he must refer to other constitutional rules and
settled practices under the rules to select the theory that "provides a
smoother fit with the constitutional scheme as a whole." By this
process, he develops a theory of the Constitution "in the shape of a
88. Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41.
89. Social Rules, supra note 3, at 876.
90. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1, at 196; Sartorius, supra
note 13, at 15·8.
91, See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1083,
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complex set of principles and policies that justify that scheme of government," and by reference to which he is now able to decide the hard
constitutional issue in the case before him. 02 The same process is
applicable to cases involving statutes and the common law. Hercules
must "construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that
provide a coherent justification for all common law precedents and,
so far as these are to be justified on principle, constitutional and
statutory provisions as well." 93
Dworkin's dual claim that this search for the "soundest" solution to a hard case not only accurately describes the Anglo-American judicial function but will also yield a single correct decision in
every case faces theoretical, empirical, and practical objections. In
the remainder of this article, I briefly discuss these difficulties without
attempting to resolve them, and then consider whether the rights
thesis, even if valid, can be accommodated to the positivist's basic
model.
A.

Assessing the Thesis

1. Theoretical Problems
Any attempt to assess the above claims confronts at the outset the
problem of understanding just what is meant, in the present context,
by "coherence" or by "a soundest theory of law." Dworkin and
Sartorius, however, have done much to try to clarify these notions,
and I shall not expand on their efforts here. 04 Even if one understands what is required of a judge trying to apply the rights thesis, the
plausibility of the thesis would still be difficult to test because of the
clear separation of the claim that there is always a single right answer
from the claim that any mere mortal could be expected to know that
he had found it. Only Hercules can do that, as Dworkin illustrates. oti
Indeed, Sartorius goes so far as to admit "that it is unreasonable to
expect that it would be possible, even in principle, to develop some
form of judicial proof procedure which would permit one to demonstrate the correctness, let alone the unique correctness, of a putatively
correct decision in all cases." 96
These merely practical problems, however, prove the claim theoretically untenable only if one holds a theory of truth that makes the
92. Id. at 1084-85.
93. Id. at 1094.

94. For a further examination and critique of the notion of a "soundest theory
of law," see Note, Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14 MICH. L. R.Bv. 1167 (1976).
95. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1083-101.
96. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 201.
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testability of a claim a precondition of its meaningfulness. Let us
assume that claims can be true though they are unprovable "even in
principle." 07 We can then also agree with Sartorius that uniquely
correct decisions for legal cases exist if the following conditions are
met: (1) There is a unique set of exclusively relevant legal standards that bear on the issue. (2) These standards have relative weights
for use in cases of conflict. (3) Some method exists for resolving ties
when conflicting standards are evenly balanced. 98
Of these three conditions, Sartorius acknowledges a theoretical
problem only in connection with the third:- One has no guarantee
that cases will not arise in which conflicting principles are evenly
balanced. Sartorius' response is that this possibility is so unlikely that
the theoretical model remains a viable hypothetical model for the
judge and justifies his search for the correct answer in all cases.~ 9 The
second condition-that unique, pre-established weights attach to the
pluralistic and undoubtedly conflicting institutional standards one is
likely to discover in any hard case--is more troublesome. Several
commentators have argued that this aspect of the claim is unproved
and implausible. 100 Sartorius, for example, simply asserts at this
point in the argument that the same test of institutional support
that isolates the relevant standards will also reveal their relative
weights. 101 Again, the problem does not seem to lie with the theoret97. See id. at 185: "[l]t is clear that, in mathematics, we have learned
that truth cannot be equated with provability."
98. See id. at 189-99.
99. Compare Sartorius, supra note 13, at 158-59, with R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL
CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 199-204. This response, of course, concedes that the
theoretical validity of the model cannot be established, however "rarely" one might
suppose evenly balanced cases will occur. As one commentator notes, what may
be "rare" in comparison to the totality of cases--easy and hard-may not be rare
at all if "hard cases" alone are considered. See Note, supra note 94, at 1193.
At this point, the argument over whether judges should accept the model, despite
the theoretical imperfections, shifts to the level of normative legal theory. See note
4 supra. The proponent of the rights thesis anchors his normative claims primarily
in considerations drawn from the role of a judge in a democracy and from the perceived unfairness of "retroactive" resolutions of social disputes. An opponent of
the thesis might agree with Llewellyn that the "single right answer" view "tends,
along with pressure of work and human avoidance of sweat, to encourage taking
the first seemingly workable road which [appears], thus giving the more familiar an
edge up on the more wise." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 83, at 25. Note that this
normative dispute results from focusing on the impact of the rights thesis on judges
at opposite ends of the spectrum from "easy" to "hard" cases. Judges who strike
"new" ground in "hard cases" may find shelter in the thesis from accusations that
judges are merely legislating their own personal views; but they do so arguably only
at the cost of being too quick to decide in other cases that they are in fact dealing
with an "easy" case.
100. See MacCallum, Dworkin on Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PmL. 638, 640
(1963); Christie, supra note 10, at 656; Raz, supra note 10, at 846.
101. See R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 193.
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ical claim that all institutional standards relevant to a decision will
have fixed, relative weights at any point in time, but only with the
likelihood that any procedure can be developed to reveal those
weights. In this respect, the thesis is perhaps best viewed, as far as its
theoretical validity is concerned, as a sketch of the hypothetical
framework implied by judicial opinions that are written as if the
decision in a hard case were uniquely required, much as Kelsen's
theory may be viewed as an attempt to describe what must be
hypothesized if one is to explain the normative aspect of law .102
There remains, however, one problem that has been largely overlooked. In fact, the problem arises in connection with what has
apparently been assumed to be the most plausible aspect of the
thesis: -the assumption that a unique set of pre-existing, decisionrelevant legal standards exists in every case. Elaboration of the
problem requires brief reference once again to Fuller's writings on the
nature of adjudication, referred to earlier in this article, in a different
context. 103 Fuller's view is that some kinds of disputes are inherently
inappropriate for resolution through adjudicative methods. The explanation for and description of what constitutes these "limits of
adjudication" is varied and sometimes obscure, with the "polycentric" nature of the issue usually serving as the predominant sign that
the limits have been reached. 104 On one interpretation of this model,
what makes some problems nonjusticiable is the absence of the
pre-existing standards upon which rational, judicial decisionmaking
depends. 105
Now Sartorius explicitly draws on Fuller's theory of adjudication
in developing the rights thesis as an apparent explication of the
concept of adjudication. 106 Dworkin explicitly characterizes the
thesis in its descriptive aspect as explaining "the present structure
of the institution of adjudication." 107 If the rights thesis indeed
102. See note 6 supra.
103. lSee sources cited note 58 supra.
104. "A polycentric problem is one which has many centres of stress and direction of force, only some of which are likely to be the focus of attention when a
decision in the area is made . . . ." Weiler, supra note 81, at 423.
105. Id. at 420-21. "Polycentricity" does not seem to mean the same thing as
"lacking pre-existing decisional standards." As Fuller uses the term, polycentricity
seems to imply just the opposite-namely, that there are too many inter-related and
decision-relevant standards to allow a court to manage them all in the adjudicative
setting. Thus, it is not clear that polycentric issues would cause Dworkin's Hercules
any problem, or, correspondingly, that Dworkin would concede that any issues are
inherently nonjusticiable. See text at notes 118-20 infra & note 119 infra.
106. R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 168 (emphasis original).
107. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1101.
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amounts to an explication of the concept of judging, and if it is true
that some problems can arise that are inherently nonjusticiable for
lack of pre-existing decisional standards, then the validity of the claim
that there is a single right answer in every case depends, even in
theory, on a further empirical investigation into the kind and range of
jobs we have, in fact, given to courts.108 One may, of course, hope
that courts have themselves properly applied doctrines of justiciability
to limit the cases they accept to those with pre-existing decisional
standards. But neither Dworkin nor Sartorius undertakes any such
investigation. Courts may, after all, have made mistakes in applying
justiciability doctrines. And although mistakes made by judges
about the legally required result in normal cases leave untouched the
claim that there was a right answer, mistakes in deciding what is
justiciable leave the courts dealing with "polycentric" cases as to
which the claim of single right answer is, by definition, false. 109
Furthermore, apart from the question of mistakes, not all state courts,
let alone English courts, adhere to doctrines of justiciability similar to
those that have been applied in federal courts. To the extent that the
single-right-answer thesis is meant to apply to all cases heard by
Anglo-American courts, its validity will again depend upon empirical
investigations yet to be undertaken by proponents of the thesis.
The rights thesis advocate might, of course, reply that the single
right answer claim applies only to those cases in which the deciding
official is acting qua judge. But this response makes the thesis
considerably less interesting. One may accept the rights thesis as an
explication of the ideal embraced by the concept of adjudication and
still be left with the problem of determining which of the cases that
come before courts are compatible with that ideal. One cannot draw
the line between these two kinds of cases on the basis of "those that
do and those that do not have pre-existing standards and right
answers," for that is precisely what is in question.
Clearly, much depends on how broad a claim is being made for
the single-right-answer ("no discretion") thesis. Dworkin at one
point appeared to exclude constitutional cases from the reach of the
thesis110 and at other times seems to have limited the common-law
claim to the standard kinds of civil cases that courts customarily
108. See generally MacCallum, supra note 100, at 640.
109. By deciding a nonjusticiable case a court may, of course, by that very act
(and the accompanying articulation of standards) make future such cases justiciable,
although one is still left with an unavoidable instance of judicial legislation in the
first decision.
110. See Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 634 n.6. But see Hard Cases, supra
note 3, at 1083-85; Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 375 n.46.
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handle. 111 Depending on what counts as a "typical civil case," one
might support the proposition that these at least fall into the class of
the justiciable. But if legislative instructions to courts to decide
matters that are not justiciable (or the voluntary acceptance by courts
of such matters) are automatically disqualified as counterexamples to
the thesis on the ground that they are not the sort of cases to which
the claim applies, then the thesis again threatens to become as interesting as a tautology.
One can, perhaps, avoid these problems by looking for the limits
of the thesis in the context of the dispute out of which it arose in the
first place. Dworkin, after all, is talking about "hard cases"-those
for which the positivist admits there are standards that can lead to
only one result in some cases, but not in all. Dworkin's claim might
be that if there are any admitted standards, then the solution to the
case is always determined: once justiciable, then always and thoroughly justiciable. Whether this fully restores the theoretical base of
the claim depends, perhaps, on whether one agrees that justiciability
can only be an all or nothing matter, and that moving beyond what
can be traced to a common or general consensus in applying standards entails a problem that is significantly different, as respects
"justiciability," from problems raised by cases that are standardless
from the beginning.112
·

2.

Empirical Problems

Empirical problems arise when one looks for evidence that the
rights thesis does, in fact, accurately describe the Anglo-American
system of adjudication even in cases that are theoretically justiciable.
Given the difficulty of the task demanded by the thesis and the
present scarcity of Herculeses, it is, after all, entirely conceivable that
a society would deliberately opt, in designing its legal system, for less
than the ideal. A legal system might, that is, authorize judges
(through the rule of recognition) to abandon the search for the right
answer in hard cases despite its theoretical existence, and to exchange
the role of "judge" in such cases for that of an informed, conscientious legislator.
In this respect, Dworkin's most recent article is puzzling, for it
appears designed less to argue that the thesis holds than to provide an
account, in the hypothetical sense described above, of how judges
could in theory operate under such a thesis assuming that it holds.
Consider the illustration from the game of chess that Dworkin em111. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1060.
112. Cf. id. at 1080.
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ploys. 113 We are to assume that the rules of chess include a rule
directing the referee to forfeit a game if one of the players "unreasonably" annoys the other in the course of play. The referee must decide
whether Tal's smile is sufficiently annoying to justify a forfeit by virtue
of the rule. Like Hercules, the referee must construct from the
institution of chess a sufficiently precise theory of the game to yield a
single correct answer in every case of annoying conduct. But we
know that this is what the referee must do only because Dworkin
assumes that he has been instructed to treat the rule in this fashion,
despite its vagueness. If chess really did include such a rule, a
referee's proper response could normally be determined only after
marshalling other evidence beyond the rule and the game of chess
alone. If, for example, referees decided that they should first issue
warnings before declaring forfeits (in reality, the most likely possibility) one would probably conclude that the referee believes he is
authorized to exercise quasi-legislative power to declare rules prospectively. One would not have a "right" to a forfeit until conduct, now
specifically described, occurred for a second time. The point is that
whether a system of standards is to be viewed as a system of entitlements, like the question whether any particular standard is a rule or a
principle, cannot be determined solely from a priori inspection of the
standard or set of standards without considering the empirically
determined attitudes toward such standards of those who must administer and live under them.
The evidence on which both Dworkin and Sartorius rest their
empirical claims consists almost exclusively of what they discover in
the attitudes of judges and ordinary litigants. They claim that this
attitude, as reflected in judicial opinions and the arguments litigants
make, reveals that the relevant judicial community believes it has
been instructed to treat the legal system as a system of entitlements,
however vague the standard that is being applied. But surely this is
rather selective evidence. If one takes into account the views of the
entire legal profession, as Dworkin seems prepared to do in deciding
which principles are legal principles,114 one would have to balance the
cited empirical evidence against the contrary views of numerous
scholars and judges who have claimed that judges are authorized to
make fresh choices in hard cases.11 5 One would also have to account
113. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078-82.
114. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41.
115. Sartorius acknowledges that this is the "nearly universal view of academic
lawyers and legal philosophers . . . [f]ound in journal articles too numerous to mention." R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNoucr, supra note 1, at 181, 182 n.2; In addition to H.L.A. Hart, others whom either Sartorius or Dworkin have identified as
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for the increasing practice of prospective overruling in both commonlaw and constitutional cases. 116 Finally, even the cited evidence
would normally have to be weighed against arguments designed to
explain why judges and litigants might act as if their decisions were
uniquely required, even though they knew in fact that they were
not. 117
3.

Practical Problems

The practical objection to the rights thesis, ably presented in a
recent article by Professor Greenawalt, 118 is a synthesis of both the
theoretical and empirical problems. If one can transform vague
standards into standards that embody entitlements simply by adding a
directive to view them as such, it is not clear what practical difference
the thesis makes to judges, litigants, or other participants in the
system. Thus, Dworkin is prepared to accept sentencing decisions by
judges as cases involving strong (legislative) discretion. Yet nothing
in Dworkin's account explains why the standards to which a judge
refers in determining a sentence could not, in theory, yield a single
correct sentence via the Herculean route; these decisions should also
become matters of right once the judges are instructed to include
sentencing decisions within the ambit of the thesis. 119 Administrative
agencies determining "fair rates" or "unfair trade practices" differ
from judges determining "unreasonable restraints of trade" or standards of "due care" only because the latter -are instructed to treat the
standards as yielding institutionally correct answers, whereas the
holding views that, in varying degrees, are inconsistent with the rights thesis include
Gerald MacCallum, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Cohen, John Dickenson, William O.
Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Paul Freund, Gidon Gottleib, Henry M. Hart, Jr., Karl
Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, Albert M. Sacks, and A.W.B. Simpson. 'See Sartorius.
The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 ETiilcs 171, 172, 177, 178 (1968);
R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 182 & nn. 2, 3, & 6, 190, 194;
Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 624-25 n.1. It must be admitted that attempts
to characterize writers as belonging clearly to one side or the other of this dispute
can be a risky business when one considers variations in context and in the way
the issue is posed. Thus, it has been argued that none of Dworkin's representative
antagonists, properly interpreted, can be said to support a view of strong judicial
discretion-a claim that, if true, only lends weight to the empirical evidence for
the rights thesis. See Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574 (1975),
116. See Greenawalt, supra note 10, at 385 n.64.
117. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 83, at 24; cf. Voltaire, Epitre a /'Auteur
du Livre des Trois lmposteurs, Nov. 10, 1770 ("If God did not exist, it would be
necessary to invent him").
118. See Greenawalt, supra note 10.
119. Cf. id. at 372-74. One might resist this conclusion by suggesting that sentencing decisions are inherently nonjusticiable and thus not among the range of cases
to which the rights thesis could apply. This response reintroduces the theoretical
problem of explaining the scope of the thesis in a way that does not beg the question
and that yields an independent test of justiciability. See text at notes 105-12 supra.
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former are not. If we give the administrative agency's standard to the
court, or, conversely, instruct the administrative agency to view the
' standard as incorporating institutionally correct solutions, then the
distinction disappears-but only in theory. Even the legislator-the
paradigmatic case of a decisionmaker with "legal discretion" to pass
laws whether or not they conform to results thought to be required by
moral or political theory-may lose his discretion if one incorporates
in the constitution a directive to pass only legislation "in the public
interest." Such a directive will presumably transform criticisms directed at the wisdom of the law into criticisms that the law is an
incorrect measure of the public interest and thus a violation of preexisting, system-incorporated rights.
Whenever the standard is vague, as in these cases, it is difficult to
see what practical difference will result from these alternative methods of describing the system. By hypothesis, reasonable men will
differ about what the standard requires, and more than one solution
will fall within the range of reasonable difference. In the absence of
a real Hercules to resolve the dispute, one is hard pressed to explain
how behavior is affected by the fact that one is instructed to seek a
system-determined "right" answer instead of being told that more than
one solution (within the reasonable range) is system-acceptable, even
though there may be in some theoretical sense an extra-systemic
"right" answer. 120

B. Accommodating the Thesis to the Positivist's Model
Despite the seriousness of the preceding objections, the rights
thesis can at least be viewed as a plausible theoretical explication of
the ideal embraced in the concept of adjudication. As such, Dworkin's writings provide a valuable check to the temptation to view
controversial judicial decisions-simply because they are controversial-as nothing more than rationalizations of a judge's personal
views. Even though the ideal has not been shown to be practically or
empirically compatible with all the controversies that judges decide,
Dworkin and Sartorius help draw attention to the unresolved questions that should be investigated before the thesis is rejected in any
particular case as the model that should guide a conscientious judge.
Let us assume that these questions can be resolved and that the rights
thesis is correct. How might the positivist respond to the claim that
the thesis provides a counterexample to his theory?
120. On the basis of similar considerations, Sartorius now acknowledges that
"[t]he issue about the existence of uniquely correct decisions is to some extent a
red herring." R. SARTORIUS, 1NDMDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1, at 201-02 (footnote
omitted),
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One possibility is simply to extend the argument made earlier in
this paper in accommodating purpose to the positivist's model in the
easy case. 121 We suggested there that the same master test that
identifies the rule also identifies the commonly agreed purpose used
to interpret the rule. The rights thesis asserts that legal standards beyond those implicit in language and purpose contribute to the resolution of the hard case. But the identification of these additional standards is not made through a process different in kind from that involved in the easy case. The only difference is that instead of confining
one's attention to a particular rule and its purposes, the investigation
now broadens to include the entire institution and all relevant rules
and practices, together with their underlying purposes. In this manner,
one extracts a complex set of standards for use in finding the soundest
solution to the case in question. The ultimate test for whether a
standard has the necessary "institutional support" 122 and hence
counts as "law'' will be exceedingly complex, but simplicitly was
never claimed as a feature of the positivist's theoretical model.
Professor Sartorius, who otherwise agrees with the essence of the
rights thesis, argues along these lines that the thesis remains consistent
with positivism:
Although the actual filling out of such an ultimate criterion would
be a complex and demanding task for any mature legal system, if
it is indeed a practical possibility at all, the only claim that need be
made is that it is in principle possible, and that it is just this possibility
which in principle underlies the identification of something as an authoritative legal standard. Although perhaps it is a good way from
Hart's version of positivism, it is in accord with the fundamental
positivistic tenet as described by Dworkin: "The law of a community
. . . can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests
having to do not with ... content but with ... pedigree . . . ."123
Dworkin's response to this attempt to rescue positivism is found in
the second article in his trilogy. 124 "Institutional support" cannot
serve as an ultimate test for law in the positivist's sense, because the
rights thesis does not require a judge, in attempting to construct the
soundest theory of law, to accept as dispositive the fact that other
judges accept any particular theory as the soundest. Each judge's
task is to find the unique soundest theory, the content of which,
121. See text at notes 45-47 supra.
122. The term was employed by Dworkin in his original article and became the
focus for his subsequent debate with Sartorius over the compatibility of positivism
and the rights thesis. See Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 41; Sartorius, supra
note 13, at 156; Social Rules, supra note 3, at 874-78; R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL
CoNDucr, supra note 1, at 204-10.
123. Sartorius, supra note 13, at 156.
124. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 876-78.
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however, is largely independent of what other judges think it to be.
The distinction is between what Dworkin calls a "normative rule,"
which ascribes duties to individuals whether or not they accept or
acknowledge them, and a "social rule," which only describes duties
that are, in fact, accepted. 125 The positivist's test is a social rule. The
rights thesis, in contrast, imports a test that makes relevant to the
determination of legal validity normative arguments about what
"ought" to be recognized -as accepted practice, whether or not it is so
recognized.
There are two paths one might take in evaluating this response,
each corresponding to a different interpretation of what it means to
say that "normative arguments" must occur in applying a test of
"institutional support." The first interpretation views "normative arguments" as referring only to what is entailed by the need to provide
a "consistent rationale" for accepted practices, with the latter still
serving, in the positivist's sense, as the basic mark of a community's
legal standards. This is the path Sartorius takes. 126 People can,
after all, disagree about what consistency requires with respect to
unanticipated or controversial issues, and in that sense disagree about
what "ought" to be done, while still agreeing that maximum consistency with existing practices determines the correct answer. Normative arguments in this•sense, although they may take into account the
reasons for or the underlying purposes of existing practices, make
no attempt to justify those underlying purposes or baseline practices.
But Dworkin also uses "normative argument" in a sense that explicitly
denies the conclusive relevance of any baseline reference to concordant
practices. It is in this sense that a vegetarian might argue that it
is a present duty of society to refrain from killing animals for food,
even though existing practice does not conform to such a rule. 127
Let us assume that normative arguments in this second sense are
properly made whenever judges decide "hard cases." One might still
be able to view the resulting legal system as compatible with positivism by distinguishing between two levels at which such normative
arguments about the law may be advanced: At the basic level, determined by the rule of recognition, one may find a social rule setting
forth instructions phrased in normative terms for the identification of
legal standards; at a secondary level, one may discover normative
arguments about whether those instructions have been followed. If
normative arguments are limited to the secondary level, the master
125. See id. at 860.
126. See R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 209.
127. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 861-62.
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rule model remains theoretically intact and basically a social rule test
for law, even though all of the crucial arguments about the legally
required result in particular cases occur at this secondary, normative
level.
The point can be illustrated by reference to an assumed Kingdom
of Rex, with the social rule of recognition that "whatever Rex enacts
is law" and a single enactment by Rex: "All disputes are to be
settled as justice requires." In this simplified equity system, normative disputes (in the second sense) will arise over what is required by
the system's explicit incorporation of moral standards. But what
makes these disputes at all relevant as a means of determining the law
is the fact that the appropriate officials accept, in Hart's sense, the
basic rule of recognition. Hart is the first to concede that in this
respect law and morality may well overlap, as evidenced in the United
States, for example, by a variety of constitutional concepts that "explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values." 128
Far from providing a counterexample to the positivist's conceptual
model, such systems reenforce the theoretical validity of that model
by making the legal relevance of the normative debate dependent on
the instructions contained in the master test. 129
128. CoNcEPT OF LA.w, supra note 2, at 199.
129. The simplified equity system described in the text may strike many as too
indeterminate to yield the kind of guidance normally associated with the existence
of a "legal system." See J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 137-39 (1975);
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 34, 39 (1963). The force of this objection
should diminish as courts begin to accumulate a body of case law and to recognize
that "doing justice" includes taking account of settled expectations under such cases,
even if it is thought that some of them had initially been decided erroneously. See
Sartorius, supra note 13, at 152. Compare R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CONDUCT, supra
note 1, at 176-79, with R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 43, at 150-52. Indeed, it has
never been clear that the common law, which includes judicial power to overrule
past decisions, operates differently in any essential respect from a system that might
have emerged from Rex's equity system. See Simpson, The Common Law and Legal
Theory in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 79, 85-88 (2d ser., A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973 ). But see J. RAz, supra, at 140.
In any event, objections to counting such systems as "legal" do not affect the
point made in the text: One who insists that such systems are "legal" wiII find
that Hart's model can accommodate the system. Hart's version of positivism, in
short, need not be seen as conceptually linking "law" with a requirement that legal
standards be ascertainable with any specified degree of certainty. (Raz, in contrast,
does insist on just such a conceptual link. See id. at 146 (systems of "absolute
discretion are not legal systems")). Hart, it is true, claims that in cases of sufficient
uncertainty the judge's decision is not determined by legal norms, but that claim
can be explained as based not on what is logically entailed by Hart's definition
of law or his account of social rules, but on empirical assumptions concerning what
most legal systems could realistically expect, and have in fact demanded, of judges
in hard cases. If Dworkin's Herculean instructions can intelligibly be given to judges
and can be defended as yielding (in theocy) externally determined solutions, as the
rights thesis assumes, Hart's account of law can adjust to the different empirical
assumption without altering the basic theoretical model. See text at notes 132-35
infra.
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Dworkin's description of the Anglo-American legal system differs
from Rex's equity system only because the instruction given to judges
is of the more complex form, described by the rights thesis. Normative debates about the "soundest theory of law" occur and are legally
relevant (assuming the empirical claims are established) only because
the underlying social rule directs judges to engage in this method of
resolving hard cases. That this is the case is revealed by the fact that
at critical points throughout Dworkin's argument-in deciding
whether standards are rules or principles and whether the legal system is a system of entitlements-resolution of the issue, as we have
seen, turns on an inspection of the actual attitudes and practices of the
relevant community. Indeed, the only empirical evidence for the rights
thesis itself is based on claims about what is accepted in fact by judges
and litigants as the proper way to decide cases. This inevitable recourse to empirically measured attitudes to resolve critical issues in
Dworkin's account supports, rather than contradicts, the thesis that the
ultimate test for law is a basic rule of recognition, determined by
reference to the accepted practice of the officials of the system.
Viewed in this light, the dispute between Hart and Dworkin
concerning judicial discretion in hard cases emerges as a dispute over
the empirical question discussed in a preceding section: It is a
disagreement over what are in fact the accepted "closure instructions"130 for the system. Hart suggests that judges have accepted
closure instructions directing them to decide the hard case through
the exercise of quasi-legislative discretion. 131 Dworkin claims that the
closure instructions in such cases require judges to perform the Herculean task described in Hard Cases. In either case, it remains true that
how and whether a particular system is closed is an empirical question, to be determined by inspection of the directions that the judge
finds in the positivist's master test-the accepted social rule of recognition.132
A determined nonpositivist might respond to this final attempt at
reconciliation between positivism and the rights thesis in three ways.
First, he may question 'whether it remains meaningful to talk of a
"test" of "pedigree" in systems such as Rex's where the positivist's
theoretical model is preserved, but only at the cost of rendering it of
little practical use in resolving critical arguments about what "the
law" requires. This objection highlights the ambiguity of the term
130. See text at notes 37-38 supra.
131. See C.C. art. 1 (Swiss Civil Code 1972) (judge is to decide cases in which
a rule is unclear as if he were a legislator); J. STONE, supra note 38, at 29 n.21, 189
&n.124.
132. See J. STONE, supra note 38, at 188-89.

514

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:473

"positivism" itself. It may be that we have moved some distance
from the view that a ~•master test," capable of actually identifying
with some precision all standards relevant to legal decision, forms the
core of a positivist's theory. It may also be that those who believe
there is a conceptual link between "legal standards" and some minimum degree of authoritative definiteness and clarity in such standards133 will refuse to categorize the standards used to decide cases in
Rex's system as "legal." But if the "core" of a positivist's theory is,
instead, "the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth
that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality," 134 then
Rex's equity system and the rights thesis are both consistent with a
positivist's perspective. Moral standards become relevant to legal
decisions in both cases only because they are contingently, not necessarily, made relevant by social rules. Content is crucial in deciding
which standards to use, but only because pedigree makes it so. The
fact that one cannot provide a proof procedure either for checking the
accuracy of decisions employing such legally adopted moral standards
or for demonstrating which such standards are the correct ones, does
not affect the core claim that legal and moral standards are conceptually distinct. 135
A second response to the claim that the rights thesis represents a
disagreement over closure instructions might try to capitalize on the
very fact that such a claim concedes the existence of disagreement concerning this particular aspect of the rule of recognition. Even
though the empirical evidence for the rights thesis may be inconclusive, it is, we have suggested, at least strong enough to indicate
that a genuine and unresolved dispute exists over the question of
how to decide hard cases. Thus, Dworkin has indeed provided
a counterexample to the thesis that in every legal system there
exists a social rule that settles the limits of a judge's duty qua judge.
But this thesis is largely one of Dworkin's own making, rather than an
essential aspect of positivism or a claim that Hart makes, "at least in
his more careful moments."1 36 Hart has never denied that the rule of
recognition may itself be uncertain in some respects, and that authoritative resolution of some questions may thus depend on a court's
success in getting a particular decision accepted by the rest of the
133. See note 129- supra; Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided Case, 81
U. PA. L. REV. 115, 126 (1932).
134. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 181.
135. Cf. R. SARTORWS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 208-09. See also
note 129 supra.
136. R. SARTORWS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at 210.
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relevant community. "Here all that succeeds is success."137 One
may agree with Dworkin that until such success is achieved, the
positivist must admit that there simply is no social rule on the issue. 138
But that admission leaves the theoretical model intact, raising at most
a question of the relationship between, on the one hand, the efficacy
of a legal system, and, on the other, the degree of uncertainty that can
be tolerated in the rule of recognition. When an unresolved question
is fundamental, the existence of the legal system may be seriously
threatened. 139 But when, as here, the question concerns how judges
should decide hard cases, the riots occur in the academic journals, not
in the streets, and are thus "system tolerable" in the extreme.140
A third possible response at once illustrates both the incompleteness of Dworkin's argument and the potential threat that the rights
thesis could pose for the positivist if the argument could be completed.
The analogy to Rex's equity system, it might be suggested, misses
the point or assumes what is in issue. The analogy assumes that
the normative dispute turns into a sociological question of fact
once one reaches the claim that "whatever Rex enacts is law." But it
is this basic claim itself that the rights thesis subjects to legally
relevant, normative debate. A judge in Rex's system does not acquit
himself of his responsibility to apply "the law" by showing only that a
particular decision is "just," and that Rex has decreed that cases be
decided as justice requires. The judge must also be prepared to
entertain, as legally relevant, arguments concerning the ultimate justification, if any, (not merely the stated or implicit reasons for accept137. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 149.
138. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 871-72.
139. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 149.
140. Thus, it is hard to agree with Dworkin that uncertainty in this respect is
somehow more fatal to positivism than uncertainty concerning a rare issue such as
Parliament's power to bind future parliaments. !See Social Rules, supra note 3, at
872. It is true that "hard cases" arise more frequently than cases involving Parliament's power to pass entrenching clauses; in that sense the disagreement over closure
instructions is an issue judges must continually face. 'But unlike the case of judges
in disagreement about what to do if Parliament did pass an entrenching clause, disputes about how one is to decide "hard cases" will largely escape detection in the
actual outcome of cases given the practical difficulty of distinguishing between the
exercise of weak discretion on the one hand and strong, but wise, discretion on the
other. See text at notes 118-20 supra.
For similar reasons, the fact that judicial decisions are written as if there is a
"right answer" does not prove the judges have accepted the rights thesis. Because
of the practical problems of distinguishing strong from weak discretion, decisions
are not likely to distinguish explicitly between the claim that a decision is "correct"
as measured by pre-existing legal standards (a judicial opinion) and the claim that
the decision is "correct" as measured by political or moral philosophy (a legislative
opinion). Of course, in applying closure instructions applicable only to "hard cases,"
judges can make mistakes in deciding when they are dealing with such a case. See
text at notes 49 & 98 supra.
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ance) of the rule that "whatever Rex enacts is law." It is in this
sense that the "process of justification must carry the lawyer very deep
into political and moral theory, and well past the point where it would
be accurate to say that any 'test' of 'pedigree' exists for deciding which
of two different justifications of our political institutions is superior."141
Under this interpretation, the issue between Dworkin and the
positivist is sharply joined in a way that admittedly does not permit
reconciliation. But the interpretation raises two new problems. First,
it now seems clear that one could no longer draw any distinction
between legal standards, on the one hand, and extra-legal-moral or
political-standards on the other;142 as a result, the rights thesis
collapses into the most traditional kind of classical natural law theory.
Second, one is now left without any argument to support the newly
interpeted thesis; for the thesis now appears to have left the confines
of descriptive theory for the larger realm of conceptual inquiry into
the meaning and nature of "law." Dworkin's analysis of "social" and
"normative" rules may be both conceptual and accurate. One may
concede, that is, that the language of obligation can be used either to
describe acknowledged duties or to assert that duties exist, whether or
not they are acknowledged. But what is missing from this account is
an argument that demonstrates that "law" necessarily rests on an
underlying normative rather than social rule. As an empirical matter, it is difficult to deny that social structures can be organized in
ways that fit the positivist's model-that is, in such a way as to make
the fact of acceptance the final court of appeal in determining the
appropriateness of applying organized sanctions to specified conduct.
Insistence upon the necessary legal relevance of normative appeals
beyond what is, in fact, accepted requires one to explain what it is
about the nature of "law" that makes this newly interpreted thesis a
more accurate account of the concept of a legal system. In the
conclusion to this paper, I shall briefly describe the kind of investigation that might be expected to provide such an explanation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be helpful to place the preceding discussion into somewhat
141. See Social Rules, supra note 3, at 877.
142. Raz and Sartorius both conclude that Dworkin is driven to this position
when he attempts to maintain his thesis as a counterexample to positivism. See
Raz, supra note 10, at 844; R. SARTORIUS, INDMDUAL CoNDUCT, supra note 1 at
208. Dworkin, on the other hand, appears steadfastly to resist the suggestion that
his thesis entails the inability to distinguish legal from nonlegal standards. Compare
id. at 206, with Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1105-06.
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broader perspective by comparing Dworkin's attack on positivism
with other nonpositivist theories.
Legal positivism's traditional target was the classical natural law
theorist's claim that norms otherwise identifiable as "law" would not,
in fact, qualify as law if they were sufficiently unjust. Dworkin's
attack belongs to a more modem version of nonpositivism. The new
nonpositivist does not deny that if one can determine a norm is law,
further reference to content is unnecessary for determining the norm's
legal status. Instead, the attack is directed at the antecedent of that
hypothetical. In some cases, one cannot determine whether the norm
is law at all without first inspecting content; in these cases, at least,
the separation of fact and value becomes blurred and the conclusion
that the norm is law may entail the conclusion that the norm is not
unjust (at least not egregiously so).
The common feature of both the classical and modem approach
(in addition to their rejection of the more extreme versions of legal
realism) is a refusal to accept the positivist's insistence on the strict
separation of the "is" and the "ought"; in this respect both might be
thought to represent varieties of a natural law theory. But the
obvious difference between the two approaches is important and
should not be glossed over by the choice of a label designed to
emphasize the common feature. Faced with an unambiguously evil
statute, enacted by a supremely competent legislature, the new "natural law" theorist, unlike his classical predecessor, cannot deny the
norm its legal status any more than does the positivist.143 (Both may,
of course, urge that its moral worth be considered in deciding whether
it should be obeyed.) It is only when we move from the "unambiguous" to the "hard case" that the new theorist discerns an essential
blurring of fact and value.
This difference in approach is sufficiently sharp that the classical
theorist is not likely to view the modem nonpositivist as much of an
ally. The impetus for the classical approach rested in part on the
desire to construct a unified theory of obligation: With the bottom
line for any actor-what one ought to do--as his ultimate goal, the
classical theorist needed only to restrict legal norms to those that also
passed moral muster in order to preserve a sense of unqualified
fidelity to law while maintaining the primacy of moral reasons among
the reasons for acting. In contrast, the new approach appears at
times to be making a somewhat quibbling point about the inherent
143. The accuracy of this description of Dworkin's position in comparison to
classical natural law theory depends on how one resolves the confusion concerning
whether Dworkin thinks legal and nonlegal standards can ever be separated. See
note 142 supra.
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limits of language and human foresight. When language and purpose fail to guide unequivocally, one must fall back on something
else, and that something else might just as well be (or "must be,"
depending on the particular variation of the theory) the judge's sense
of what best "coheres" with the aim of the entire legal system. The
new approach, in short, capitalizes on the problem of uncertainty to
reintroduce value judgments into descriptions of the law, but in so
doing gives away most of what the classical debate was about in the
first place.
From another perspective, however, the modern approach represents a much more serious challenge to positivism precisely because it
never was clear just what the classical debate was all about. The
claim that "immoral law is not law" apparently assumes that there is a
subject to which the predicate "immoral" can attach and thus seems
to concede that there are formal tests for legal validity; the question
whether one should also require substantive tests appears mainly as a
problem of choice on pragmatic or theoretical grounds. The positivist's choice for the wider concept, for reasons of both conceptual
clarity and practical merit in moral deliberation, 144 has never been
easy to challenge. But when the claim that there are formal tests for
validity itself is challenged, the positivist will never reach the question
of choice until he re-examines his model of law to determine whether
the alleged defects do in fact exist and, if so, whether the model can
be repaired.
I have argued that the positivist's model remains intact in the face
of Dworkin's argument, primarily because the rights thesis is cloaked
in empirical claims and girded by arguments peculiar to a particular
legal system. The conceptual theorist can discount the thesis-even
if true-as an accidental, not an essential, aspect of law, explaining
that the normative debates that the thesis entails occur only because
social rules make such debates relevant to determining legal validity.
The theory fails, in short, precisely because, and to the extent that, it
is presented and viewed as a descriptive theory. If the arguments
Dworkin makes for the need to refer beyond purpose and rule to the
underlying justification of the entire institution could be connected to
the concept of law itself, the blow to positivism would be more serious.
One possible direction that a further inquiry along these lines
might take is the following. The fundamental premise of the inquiry
would be that an adequate legal theory must preserve the distinction
between legal and coercive systems-the basis, after all, for Hart's
144. See
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criticism of Austin. 145 From that basic premise, the inquiry would
explore the extent to which a model of law that roots legal validity in
the fact of acceptance of a basic social rule by a group of officials
accurately preserves this distinction between "obligation" and "being
obliged." If_one can show that the concept of obligation is accurately
reflected only in a model of law that makes legal validity dependent,
not on the fact of acceptance alone, but also on a good-faith claim
that the system and standards thus described are "acceptable" to those
governed by the system, to that extent the positivist's model will
require modification. It is in this respect-in Dworkin's insights
concerning the persistence with which claims of legal validity are
linked with claims of normative validity-that one finds in the rights
thesis valuable hints for the development of an improved, conceptual
theory of law.
145. See note 6 supra.

